Competition and collusion in bilateral markets

Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie - Tập 36 Số 3-4 - Trang 217-245 - 1976
Oskar Morgenstern1, Gerhard Schwödiauer2
1Department of Economics,New York University,New York,USA.
2Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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