Common ownership and the spillover effect of market reaction: Evidence from stock exchange comment letters

Admati, 2009, The ‘wall street walk’ and shareholder activism: exit as a form of voice, Rev. Financ. Stud., 22, 2645, 10.1093/rfs/hhp037 Azar, 2018, Anticompetitive effects of common ownership, J. Financ., 73, 1513, 10.1111/jofi.12698 Bens, 2016, The impact of SEC disclosure monitoring on the uncertainty of fair value estimates, Account. Rev., 91, 349, 10.2308/accr-51248 Bozanic, 2017, SEC comment letters and firm disclosure, J. Account. Public Policy, 36, 337, 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2017.07.004 Brooks, 2018, Institutional cross-ownership and corporate strategy: the case of mergers and acquisitions, J. Corp. Finan., 48, 187, 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.11.003 Brown, 2018, The spillover effect of SEC comment letters on qualitative corporate disclosure: evidence from the risk factor disclosure, Contemp. Account. Res., 35, 622, 10.1111/1911-3846.12414 Brown, 2019, Too busy or well-connected? Evidence from a shock to multiple directorships, Account. Rev., 94, 83, 10.2308/accr-52165 Chen, 2010, Association between borrower and lender state ownership and accounting conservatism, J. Account. Res., 48, 973, 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2010.00385.x Cull, 2000, Bureaucrats, state banks, and the efficiency of credit allocation: the experience of Chinese state-owned enterprises, J. Comp. Econ., 28, 1, 10.1006/jcec.1999.1642 Cunningham, 2020, The switch-up: an examination of changes in earnings management after receiving SEC comment letters, Contemp. Account. Res., 37, 917, 10.1111/1911-3846.12546 Dechow, 1995, Detecting earnings management, Account. Rev., 70, 73 Dennis, 2020, Common ownership does not have anti-competitive effects in the airline industry Edmans, 2009, Blockholder trading, market efficiency, and managerial myopia, J. Financ., 64, 2481, 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01508.x Edmans, 2011, Governance through trading and intervention: a theory of multiple blockholders, Rev. Financ. Stud., 24, 2395, 10.1093/rfs/hhq145 Edmans, 2019, Governance under common ownership, Rev. Financ. Stud., 32, 2673, 10.1093/rfs/hhy108 Harford, 2011, Institutional cross-holdings and their effect on acquisition decisions, J. Financ. Econ., 99, 27, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.008 He, 2017, Product market competition in a world of cross-ownership: evidence from institutional blockholdings, Rev. Financ. Stud., 30, 2674, 10.1093/rfs/hhx028 He, 2019, Internalizing governance externalities: the role of institutional cross-ownership, J. Financ. Econ., 134, 400, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.07.019 Huddart, 1993, The effect of a large shareholder on corporate value, Manag. Sci., 39, 1407, 10.1287/mnsc.39.11.1407 Koch, 2021, Common ownership and competition in product markets, J. Financ. Econ., 139, 109, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.07.007 Lemmon, 2003, Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: evidence from the east Asian financial crisis, J. Financ., 58, 1445, 10.1111/1540-6261.00573 Lewellen, 2020, Does common ownership really increase firm coordination?, J. Financ. Econ. López, 2019, Overlapping ownership, R&D spillovers, and antitrust policy, J. Polit. Econ., 127, 2394, 10.1086/701811 Park, 2019, Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership, J. Account. Econ., 67, 387, 10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.02.001 Ryans, 2020, Textual classification of SEC comment letters, Rev. Acc. Stud. Shleifer, 1986, Large shareholders and corporate policies, J. Polit. Econ., 94, 461, 10.1086/261385 Wang, 2016, Determinants of segment disclosure deficiencies and the effect of the SEC comment letter process, J. Account. Public Policy, 35, 109, 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2015.11.005 Wei, 1997, The Siamese twins: do state-owned banks favor state-owned Enterprises in China?, China Econ. Rev., 8, 19, 10.1016/S1043-951X(97)90010-9