Common Owning, Transmission, and Development of Knowledge

Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences - Tập 6 - Trang 173-183 - 2002
Susumu Egashira1,2, Takashi Hashimoto3
1Otaru University of Commerce, Otaru, Japan
2University of Cambridge, Japan
3Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Japan

Tóm tắt

This paper studies the relationship between social institutions and individual behaviour through the development of the cognitive framework of individuals. Social sciences have had interests in social institutions or norms. Much of the studies treat the problem from the viewpoint of social costs and lack focus on individual action and cognition. To consider the problem as a whole naturally means that the discussion has to be made according to subjectivism. Setting subjectivism forth as a premise, the problem of relativity of the cognition is studied through reconsideration of the conception of information and its transfer. By adopting a multi-agent model having the cognitive framework and the interaction among agents, the formation process and the feature of institutions are computationally investigated. Simulation results confirm that the cognitive frameworks of agents are affected action mimicking others' superficial behaviour. Moreover, it is eventually shown that the assumption of isolated individuals is unwarranted even in studying in less communicative communities.

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

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Thông tin xuất bản

Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences

Tập 6

173-183

Thông tin tác giả