Commitment and Conflict in Bilateral Bargaining

American Economic Review - Tập 98 Số 4 - Trang 1629-1635 - 2008
Tore Ellingsen1, Topi Miettinen2
1Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, S-113 83, Stockholm, Sweden
2Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Straße 10, 07745, Jena, Germany

Tóm tắt

Building on previous work by Schelling and Crawford, we study a model of bilateral bargaining in which negotiators can make binding commitments at a low positive cost c. Most of our results concern outcomes that survive iterated strict dominance. If commitment attempts never fail, there are three such outcomes. In two of them, all the surplus goes to one player. In the third, there is a high probability of conflict. If commitment attempts succeed with probability q < 1, the unique outcome that survives iterated strict dominance entails conflict with probability q2. When c = 0, analogous results hold if the requirement of iterated strict dominance is replaced by iterated weak dominance. (JEL C78, D84)

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

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American Economic Review

Tập 98 Số 4

1629-1635

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