Certified or branded?
Tóm tắt
While often considered a purely financial institution, the IMF has throughout its history performed non-financial services for its membership. The latest example is the Policy Support Instrument (PSI), a certification mechanism established in 2005 for which only poor members are eligible. Based on a formal game-theoretic model, I argue that it is unlikely that the PSI will serve well the intention of facilitating capital market access for members requesting the service. Their low income, the lack of significant consequences for markets, the IMF’s traditional reluctance to criticize members, as well as the need to promote the use of the new arrangement indicate that the Fund could emphasize participants’ welfare over the interests of private lenders. The continued importance of foreign aid in eligible countries also puts the IMF in the role of gatekeeping such flows, which might conflict with sending clear signals to commercial actors. All these reasons imply that in many cases its seal of approval will be of little use to third-parties, despite the high standards to which PSI-countries are supposed to adhere. The best argument in favor of the PSI being a useful addition to the Fund’s tool kit for low-income members is the fact that several countries have already signed a second one.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Acharya, S., & Diwan, I. (1993). Debt buy-backs signal sovereign countries’ creditworthiness: Theory and tests. International Economic Review, 34, 795–817.
Bauer, M. E., Cruz, C., & Graham, B. A. T. (2011). Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval? Review of International Organizations, forthcoming.
Bevan, D. (2009). The IMF’s approach to macroeconomic policy in low-income countries. In J. M. Boughton & D. Lombardi (Eds.), Finance, development, and the IMF. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bird, G., et al. (2004). Many happy returns? Recidivism and the IMF. Journal of International Money and Finance, 23, 231–251.
Bird, G., & Rowlands, D. (1997). The catalytic effect of lending by the international financial institutions. World Economy, 20, 967–91.
Bird, G., & Rowlands, D. (2007). The IMF and the Mobilisation of Foreign Aid. Journal of Development Studies, 43, 856–870.
Bordo, M. D., & James, H. (2000). The International Monetary Fund: Its present role in historical perspective. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 7724.
Claessens, S., Cassimon, D., & Van Campenhout, B. (2009). Evidence on changes in aid allocation criteria. World Bank Economic Review, 23, 185–208.
Copelovitch, M. S. (2010). The International Monetary Fund in the global economy. Banks, bonds, and bailouts. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Cottarelli, C., & Giannini, C. (2002). Bedfellows, hostages, or perfect strangers? Global capital markets and the catalytic effect of IMF crisis lending. IMF Working Paper 02/193.
Dollar, D., & Levin, V. (2006). The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984–2003. World Development, 34, 2034–2046.
Dollar, D., & Svensson, J. (1998). What explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programs? Economic Journal, 110, 894–917.
Easterly, W. (2005). What did structural adjustment adjust? The association of policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans. Journal of Development Economics, 76, 1–22.
Eaton, J., & Fernandez, R. (1995). Sovereign debt. In G. Grossman, & K. Rogoff (Eds.), Handbook of international economics (Vol. III). Elsevier Science.
Farrell, J. (1993). Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games. Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 514–531.
Gelos, R., Sahay, R., & Sandleris, G. (2011). Sovereign borrowing by developing countries: What determines market access? Journal of International Economics, 83, 243–254.
Guitián, M. (1992). The unique nature of the responsibilities of the International Monetary Fund. IMF Pamphlet Series 46.
Hagen, R. J. (2006). Samaritan agents? On the delegation of aid policy. Journal of Development Economics, 79, 249–263.
Hagen, R. J. (2009). Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance. Journal of International Economics, 79, 126–136.
IEO (2002). Evaluation of prolonged use of IMF resources. Washington, DC: IMF.
IMF (2004). Signaling by the Fund—a historical review. Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department. Washington, DC: IMF.
IMF (2005a). Implementation of the policy support instrument. Prepared by the Policy Development and Review and Legal Departments. Washington, DC: IMF.
IMF (2005b). Policy support and signaling in low-income countries. Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department. Washington, DC: IMF.
IMF (2008). Review of the Fund’s financing role in member countries. Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department. Washington, DC: IMF.
IMF (2009a). Review of the experience with the policy support instrument. Prepared by the Strategy, Policy and Review Department. Washington, DC: IMF.
IMF (2009b). Changing patterns in low-income country financing and implications for Fund policies on external financing and debt. Prepared by the Strategy, Policy and Review Department. Washington, DC: IMF.
Ivanova, A., Mayer, W., Mourmouras, A., & Anayiotos, G. (2003). What determines the implementation of IMF-supported programs? IMF Working Paper 03/8.
Joyce, J. (2005). Time past and time present: A duration analysis of IMF program spells. Review of International Economics, 13, 283–297.
Killick, T. (2004). Politics, evidence and the new aid agenda. Development Policy Review, 22, 5–29.
Killick, T., Gunatilaka, R., & Marr, A. (1998). Aid and the political economy of policy change. London: Routledge.
Lane, T. (2009). Signaling, aid, and IMF financial arrangements for low-income countries. In J. M. Boughton & D. Lombardi (Eds.), Finance, development, and the IMF. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marchesi, S. (2003). Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling. An empirical analysis. Journal of Development Economics, 70, 403–423.
Marchesi, S., & Sabani, L. (2007). IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics. Journal of Development Economics, 84, 640–666.
Martens, B., Mummert, U., Murrell, P., & Seabright, P. (2002). The institutional economics of foreign aid. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Martin, M., Johnson, A., & Rabinowitz, G. (2009). What is the point of the PSI? The views of African policymakers. London: Development Finance International.
Moser, C., & Sturm, J.-E. (2011). Explaining IMF lending decisions after the cold war. Review of International Organizations, 6, 307–340.
Mosley, P., Harrigan, J., & Toye, J. (1991). Aid and power. The World Bank and policy-based lending. London: Routledge.
Panizza, U., Sturzenegger, F., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2009). The economics and law of sovereign debt. Journal of Economic Literature, 47, 651–698.
Pedersen, K. R. (1996). Aid, investment and incentives. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 98, 423–38.
Pedersen, K. R. (2001). The Samaritan’s dilemma and the effectiveness of foreign aid. International Tax and Public Finance, 8, 693–703.
Pedersen, K. R. (2003). Foreign aid and incentives in commercial credit markets. Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration Working Paper 67/03.
Pop-Eleches, G. (2009). From economic crisis to reform: IMF programmes in latin America and Eastern Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Radelet, S. (2006). IMF facilities for poststabilization low-income countries. In E. M. Truman (Ed.), Reforming the IMF for the 21st century. Institute for International Economics Special Report 19.
Rodrik, D. (1996). Why is there multilateral lending? In M. Bruno & B. Pleskovic (Eds.), Annual World Bank conference on development economics 1995. Washington, DC: the World Bank.
Roubini, N., & Setser, B (2004). Bailouts or bail-ins? Responding to financial crises in emerging market economies. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Steinwand, M. C., & Stone R. W. (2008). The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence. Review of International Organizations, 3, 123–149.
Stone, R. W. (2002). Lending credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the post-communist transition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Svensson, J. (2000). When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality. Journal of Development Economics, 61, 61–84.
Taylor, J. B. (2006). The policy support instrument: A key component of the recent IMF reform movement. In E. M. Truman (Ed.), Reforming the IMF for the 21st century. Institute for International Economics Special Report 19.
Thomas, A. (2009). Access to market financing for IDA-Eligible countries—The role of external debt and IMF-supported programs. IMF Working Paper 09/217.