Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 35 Số 2 - Trang 175-197 - 2010
Roman M. Sheremeta1, Jingjing Zhang2
1Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, Orange, USA
2Department of Economics, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada

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