COMBIMA: truthful, budget maintaining, dynamic combinatorial market

Bartal, Y., Gonen, R., & Nisan, N. (2003). Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions. In TARK, (pp. 72–87).

Blum, A., Sandholm, T., & Zinkevich, M. (2002). Online algorithms for market clearing. In SODA (pp. 971–980).

Blumrosen, L., & Dobzinski, S. (2014). Reallocation mechanisms. In EC (pp. 617–640).

Blumrosen, L., & Holenstein, T. (2008). Posted prices vs. negotiations: An asymptotic analysis. In EC.

Blumrosen, L., & Nisan, N. (2009). On the computational power of demand queries. SIAM Journal on Computing, 39(4), 1372–1391.

Bredin, J., Parkes, D., & Duong, Q. (2007). Chain: A dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 30, 133–179.

Buchbinder, N., & Gonen, R. (2015). Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: A primal dual approach. Algorithmica, 72(1), 167–190.

Clarke, E. H. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 2, 17–33.

Colini-Baldeschi, R., Goldberg, P., de Keijzer, B., Leonardi, S., Roughgarden, T., & Turchetta, S. (2017). Approximately efficient two-sided combinatorial auctions. In EC (pp. 591–608).

Colini-Baldeschi, R., de Keijzer, B., Leonardi, S., & Turchetta, S. (2016). Approximately efficient double auctions with strong budget balance. In SODA (pp. 1424–1443).

Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., & Steinberg, R. (2006). Combinatorial auctions. Cambridge: MIT Press.

de Vries, S., Schummer, J., & Vohra, R. (2007). On ascending vickery auctions for heterogeneons objects. Journal of Economic Theory, 132, 95–118.

Dolgov, D., & Durfee, E. (2005). Computationally-efficient combinatorial auctions for resource allocation in weakly- coupled MDPS. In AAMAS (pp. 657–664).

Feldman, M., & Frim, G., Gonen, R. (2018). Multi-sided advertising markets: Dynamic mechanisms and incremental user compensations. In GameSec.

Gerkey, B. P., & Mataric, M. J. (2002). Sold!: Auction methods for multi robot coordination. IEEE Transactions on Robotics and Automation, 18, 758–768.

Gonen, R., & Egri, O. (2017). Dycom: A dynamic truthful budget balanced double-sided combinatorial market. In AAMAS.

Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41, 617–631.

Guo, M., Markakis, E., Apt, K. R., & Conitzer, V. (2013). Undominated groves mechanisms. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), 46, 129–163.

McAfee, R. P. (1992). Dominant strategy double auction. Journal of Economic Theory, 56, 434–450.

Mishra, D., & Parkes, D. C. (2007). Ascending price Vickery auctions for general valuations. Journal of Economic Theory, 132(1), 335–366.

Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983). Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory, 29, 265–281.

Parkes, D. C., & Unger, L. H. (2000). Iterative combinatorial auctions:theory and practice. In AAAI (pp. 74–81).

Rassenti, S. J., Smith, V. L., & Bulfin, R. (1982). A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 402–417.

Sandholm, T., & Gilpin, A. (2006). Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: Near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation. In AAMAS (pp. 73–91).

Song, J., & Regan, A. (2003). Combinatorial auctions for transportation service procurement: The carrier perspective. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 1833, 40–46.

Stonebraker, M., Devine, R., Kornacker, M., Litwin, W., Pfeffer, A., Sah, A., & Staelin, C. (1994). An economic paradigm for query processing and data migration in mariposa. In PDIS (pp. 58–67).

Tovey, C., Lagoudakis, M., & Koenig, S. (2005). The generation of bidding rules for auction-based robot coordination, vol. In Multi-Robot Systems. From Swarms to Intelligent Automata Volume III. Springer.

Vaze, R., & Coupechoux, M. (2016). Online budgeted truthful matching. SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 44(3), 3–6.

Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16, 8–37.

Wurman, P., Walsh, W., & Wellman, M. (1998). Flexible double auctions for electronic commerce: Theory and implementation. Decision Support Systems, 24, 17–27.