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Quyền lực của Giám đốc điều hành, quản lý rủi ro doanh nghiệp và cổ tức: phân tách khả năng quản lý của Giám đốc điều hành khỏi sự sa lầy
Tóm tắt
Chúng tôi đóng góp vào tài liệu về chính sách cổ tức bằng cách xem xét hai yếu tố ít được chú ý nhưng quan trọng, đó là quyền lực của Giám đốc điều hành và quản lý rủi ro doanh nghiệp. Chúng tôi đầu tiên phân tách khả năng quản lý của Giám đốc điều hành khỏi sự sa lầy - hai nguồn tự chủ lãnh đạo mà thường không được phân biệt trong tài liệu trước đây. Sử dụng dữ liệu bảo hiểm (tái) của Vương quốc Anh cho phép chúng tôi định lượng khách quan và đáng tin cậy về quản lý rủi ro và xác định các bên liên quan có quyền lực với động lực giám sát (chẳng hạn như cổ đông và cơ quan quản lý), chúng tôi phát hiện ra rằng quản lý rủi ro cho phép các giám đốc điều hành bị sa lầy tăng cổ tức để tránh sự giám sát của cổ đông mà không làm suy yếu khả năng tài chính và tăng rủi ro bị kiểm tra bởi cơ quan quản lý. Hơn nữa, chúng tôi không phát hiện ra rằng mức độ khả năng quản lý của Giám đốc điều hành hay tương tác của nó với quản lý rủi ro liên quan đến cổ tức, cho thấy rằng các động lực cạnh tranh đối với các Giám đốc điều hành tài năng để trả cổ tức cao/thấp hơn đã hủy hoại nhau trong các bài kiểm tra cắt ngang. Tuy nhiên, chúng tôi phát hiện ra rằng hiệu ứng tín hiệu của cổ tức đối với thu nhập kế toán trong tương lai chỉ tồn tại ở các công ty bảo hiểm có Giám đốc điều hành có khả năng cao. Điều này nhất quán với quan điểm rằng các Giám đốc điều hành tài năng có khả năng tạo ra lợi nhuận bền vững, và khi họ chọn trả cổ tức (nhiều hơn), họ làm vậy để tín hiệu khả năng quản lý của mình ra bên ngoài.
Từ khóa
#giám đốc điều hành #quyền lực #quản lý rủi ro #cổ tức #khả năng quản lýTài liệu tham khảo
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