CEO Influence and Executive Compensation

Financial Review - Tập 31 Số 1 - Trang 51-66 - 1996
Uma V. Sridharan1
1Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634–1323

Tóm tắt

AbstractThe sales‐maximization hypothesis and the shareholder wealth‐maximization hypothesis have been suggested in prior finance literature to explain the determinants of CEO pay. This paper proposes that CEO influence over the board is an additional explanation for the size of CEO pay. Evidence from the 1989–1991 period indicates that CEO pay is positively related to measures of CEO influence over the board. Results of this study suggest that CEO salary levels are mostly a function of CEO influence over the board, the growth in sales and the size of the firm.

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

10.2307/3665717

10.1111/j.1468-232X.1981.tb00180.x

Baumol William J., 1959, Business Behavior, Value and Growth

Becker Gary S., 1964, Human Capital

Brownstein Andrew R., 1992, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders, Harvard Business Review, 70, 28

10.1016/0165-4101(85)90027-8

10.1016/0167-7187(91)90058-S

Deckop John R., 1987, New Perspectives in Compensation

Dobrzynski Judit, 1992, Calpers is Ready to Roar, but Will CEOs Listen, Businessweek, 44

Gupta Udayan, 1993, Prize Packages: When It Comes to Pay, Heads of Little Firms Can Outdo Top CEOs, The Wall Street Journal, A1

10.1086/261677

10.2307/3665681

Loomis Carol J., 1982, The Madness of Executive Compensation, Fortune, 42

10.2307/1884399

McCarroll Thomas, 1992, Executive Pay: The Shareholders Strike Back, Time, 46

McGuire Joseph W., 1962, Executive Incomes, Sales and Profits, American Economic Review, 52, 753

10.1016/0165-4101(85)90026-6

Neff Robert, 1993, What do Japanese CEOs Really Make, Businessweek, 60

Patton Arch., 1991, Executive Compensation: A Strategy Guide for the 1990s

10.1177/088636878101300402

10.2307/1884268

10.1016/0304-405X(90)90002-H

10.2307/3665877

10.1016/0304-405X(88)90053-0