Beware of mereologists bearing gifts: prolegomena to a medical metaphysics
Tóm tắt
This essay considers implications of formal mereologies and ontologies for medical metaphysics. Edward Fried’s extensional mereological account of the human body is taken as representative of a prominent strand in analytic metaphysics that has close affinities with medical positivism. I show why such accounts fail. First, I consider how Fried attempts to make sense of the medical case of Barney Clark, the first recipient of an artificial heart, and show that his analytic metaphysical categories do not have the right kind of fit with the case. A proper medical metaphysic should involve a richer two way dialogue with medicine, and it should not just “apply” formal accounts worked out in other settings. Second, I argue that any effort to account for real wholes with extensional mereological sums requires all sorts of ad hoc, supplementary mechanisms that do the real work, and the full repertoire of these mechanisms involves inconsistencies and semantic shifts. Finally, I consider an alternative strand of work on non-extensional whole/part relations that is closer to medicine and that can deepen reflection on some core problems in bioethics, for example, associated with the determination of death when an organism ceases to function as a whole. In addition to the utility such formal ontologies have for addressing traditional problems such as the determination of death, philosophers of medicine should appreciate the increasingly influential role such formal tools are playing in the development of data system ontologies. Assumptions integral to these ontologies have far reaching implications for the way future research and practice in medicine will be conducted, and much greater critical reflection is needed on the full range of issues associated with the development and use of such medical ontologies.
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