Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality

Games and Economic Behavior - Tập 83 - Trang 231-254 - 2014
Andrés Perea1
1Maastricht University, EpiCenter and Department of Quantitative Economics, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands

Tóm tắt

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

Asheim, 2002, On the epistemic foundation for backward induction, Math. Soc. Sci., 44, 121, 10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00011-2

Asheim, 2005, Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games, Games Econ. Behav., 53, 15, 10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.015

Baltag, 2009, Keep ‘hoping’ for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox, Synthese, 169, 301, 10.1007/s11229-009-9559-z

Battigalli, 1997, On rationalizability in extensive games, J. Econ. Theory, 74, 40, 10.1006/jeth.1996.2252

Battigalli, 2002, Strong belief and forward induction reasoning, J. Econ. Theory, 106, 356, 10.1006/jeth.2001.2942

Bernheim, 1984, Rationalizable strategic behavior, Econometrica, 52, 1007, 10.2307/1911196

Chen, 2013, The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games, Theoretical Econ., 8, 125, 10.3982/TE942

Dekel, 1999, Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium, J. Econ. Theory, 89, 165, 10.1006/jeth.1999.2576

Dekel, 2002, Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction, J. Econ. Theory, 104, 473, 10.1006/jeth.2001.2866

Elmes, 1994, On the strategic equivalence of extensive form games, J. Econ. Theory, 62, 1, 10.1006/jeth.1994.1001

Feinberg, 2005, Subjective reasoning–dynamic games, Games Econ. Behav., 52, 54, 10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.001

Hendon, 1996, The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality, Games Econ. Behav., 12, 274, 10.1006/game.1996.0018

Kreps, 1982, Sequential equilibria, Econometrica, 50, 863, 10.2307/1912767

Pearce, 1984, Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection, Econometrica, 52, 1029, 10.2307/1911197

Penta, 2009

Perea, 2001, Rationality in Extensive Form Games, 10.1007/978-1-4757-3391-4

Perea, 2002, A note on the one-deviation property in extensive games, Games Econ. Behav., 40, 322, 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00005-2

Perea, 2007, Epistemic foundations for backward induction: an overview, vol. 1, 159

Perea, 2010, Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning, Games, 1, 168, 10.3390/g1030168

Perea, 2012

Rubinstein, 1991, Comments on the interpretation of game theory, Econometrica, 59, 909, 10.2307/2938166

Samet, 1996, Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information, Games Econ. Behav., 17, 230, 10.1006/game.1996.0104

Shimoji, 1998, Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms, J. Econ. Theory, 83, 161, 10.1006/jeth.1997.2460

Tan, 1988, The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games, J. Econ. Theory, 45, 370, 10.1016/0022-0531(88)90276-1

Thompson, 1952