Bargaining over shares of uncertain future profits

Elsevier BV - Tập 7 - Trang 55-68 - 2019
Yigal Gerchak1, Eugene Khmelnitsky1
1Department of Industrial Engineering, Tel Aviv University, 69978, Tel Aviv, Israel.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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