Bad vibrations: new evidence on commons quality and localism at California’s surf breaks
Tóm tắt
This study extends prior empirical research on issues associated with the common-pool resource represented by California’s surf breaks by (1) expanding the test area to include all of the state’s surf breaks, (2) exploring additional aspects of surf break quality, (3) redefining “access” to the surf breaks by would-be users, and (4) re-examining linear restrictions present in prior empirical modeling. The results presented in this study are perhaps even more striking than those from prior research—indicating that marginal increases in surf break quality lead to relatively large increases in the probability of observing fierce localism at surf breaks. Results also indicate that localism is heightened along the surf breaks of Central California, an area previously unstudied. Although this study focuses on the relationship between surf break quality and localism, its findings offer greater understanding of the general importance of informal property rights protection of common-pool resources.
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