Auction design and tacit collusion in FCC spectrum auctions

Information Economics and Policy - Tập 21 - Trang 90-100 - 2009
Patrick Bajari1, Jungwon Yeo1
1University of Minnesota, Department of Economics, Twin Cities, 4-101 Hanson Hall, 1925 Fourth Street South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, United States

Tài liệu tham khảo

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