Are busy boards detrimental?

Journal of Financial Economics - Tập 109 - Trang 63-82 - 2013
Laura Field1, Michelle Lowry1, Anahit Mkrtchyan2
1Smeal College of Business, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA
2D'Amore-McKim School of Business, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, USA

Tài liệu tham khảo

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