Are Competitive Banking Systems More Stable?

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking - Tập 41 Số 4 - Trang 711-734 - 2009
Klaus Schaeck, Martin Čihák, Simon Wolfe

Tóm tắt

Using the Panzar and Rosse H‐statistic as a measure of competition in 45 countries, we find that more competitive banking systems are less prone to experience a systemic crisis and exhibit increased time to crisis. This result holds even when we control for banking system concentration, which is associated with higher probability of a crisis and shorter time to crisis. Our results indicate that competition and concentration capture different characteristics of banking systems, meaning that concentration is an inappropriate proxy for competition. The findings suggest that policies promoting competition among banks, if well executed, have the potential to improve systemic stability.

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

10.1353/mcb.2004.0038

Barth James R., 2001, In Brooking‐Wharton Papers on Financial Services, 183

10.1016/j.jfi.2003.06.002

Barth James R., 2006, Rethinking Bank Supervision and Regulation: Until Angels Govern

10.1093/wber/14.3.597

10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.05.010

10.7208/chicago/9780226092980.003.0006

10.1353/mcb.2004.0040

10.2307/1926975

Bikker Jacob A., 2004, Competition and Efficiency in a Unified European Banking Market, 10.4337/9781781957288

10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00205-4

10.1017/CBO9780511752056.017

10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00763.x

10.1016/S0167-7187(01)00092-3

Carletti Elena, 2003, Monetary History, Exchanges Rates and Financial Markets: Essays in Honour of Charles Goodhart, 202

Cetorelli Nicola, 1999, Competitive Analysis in Banking: Appraisal of the Methodologies, Economic Perspectives, 23, 2

10.1353/mcb.2004.0044

Cleves Mario A., 2003, An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using STATA

10.2307/3867330

10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00171-X

Demirgüç‐Kunt Asli andEnricaDetragiache. (2005) “Cross‐Country Empirical Studies of Systemic Bank Distress: A Survey.” IMF Working Paper 05/96 Washington DC : International Monetary Fund .

Demirgüç‐Kunt Asli BaybarsKaracaovali andLucLaeven. (2005) “Deposit Insurance around the World: A Comprehensive Database.” Policy Research Working Paper #3628 Washington DC : World Bank .

10.2307/2953695

10.1111/j.0963-8008.2004.00076.x

10.1257/aer.90.1.147

10.1017/CBO9780511528521

International Monetary Fund, 2003, Financial Soundness Indicators—Background Paper, 10.5089/9781498329477.007

Kane Edward, J., 1989, The S&L Insurance Mess: How Did It Happen

Keeley Michael, 1990, Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking, American Economic Review, 80, 1183

10.1016/S0378-4266(86)80003-6

10.1086/250042

Lucas Robert E.(1976) “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique.Carnegie‐Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 1 19–46.

10.1006/jfin.1996.0010

10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00057-9

10.1016/S0378-4266(98)00084-3

10.1016/0378-4266(94)90003-5

10.1016/0148-6195(95)00047-X

10.2307/2118485

10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00069-1

10.2307/2098582

10.1016/j.jfi.2003.08.005

10.1016/0304-3932(84)90045-X

Vesala Jukka, M., 1995, Testing for Competition in Banking: Behavioural Evidence from Finland

10.1016/j.jfi.2004.06.007