Analysis of the Merger Effect Using the Event Study Approach: Evidence from the Steel Industry in Japan

International Journal of Economic Policy Studies - Tập 9 - Trang 96-112 - 2014
Yusuke Ikuta1
1Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, Nada-ku Kobe-city, Hyogo-ken, Japan

Tóm tắt

Mergers can bring with them not only efficiency gains but also anticompetitive effects. Moreover, when firms announce mergers with limited lead time and information, it is crucial that regulatory bodies be able to judge them appropriately. This paper examines a merger between NKK and Kawasaki Steel that had a deep economic impact. I employ the conventional event study approach using abnormal stock returns. In addition to investigating these two firms and their rival firms, I examine customer firms in four steel-consuming industries in order to paint a broader picture of mergers. I consider the reactions of abnormal returns as measured by twelve patterns, and identify several merger effects. Firms in the steel industry anticipated a significant increase in their future profits as a result of this merger. Of the customer firms, some anticipated an increase in their profits, whereas others expected to suffer losses. However, the statistical significance of their reactions was weak, and, thus, the merger’s effects on customer firms could not be measured accurately. The results suggest that the primary intent of this merger was to improve efficiency. Future studies should investigate the results of the merger in real terms, including its effects on steel prices and steel production, for example, rather than merely in financial terms.

Tài liệu tham khảo

Ahern, K. R. 2012. Bargaining power and industry dependence in mergers, Journal of Financial Economics 103:530–550. Bhattacharya, S., and A. Nain. 2011. Horizontal acquisitions and buying power: A product market analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 99: 97–115. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd. 2001. Annual Report, http://www.daihatsu.com/ir/library/pdf/ annual01.pdf [Accessed 12.15.2014] Davis, P., and E. Garcés. 2010. Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Davis, S. W., and P. L. Ormosi. 2012. A comparative assessment of methodologies used to evaluate competition policy, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 8(4): 769–803. Duso, T., Gugler, K., and B. B. Yurtoglu. 2011. How effective is European merger control? European Economic Review. 55: 980–1006. Eckbo, B. E. 1983. Horizontal mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth, Journal of Financial Economics 11(1-4):241–273. Fee, C. E., and S. Thomas. 2004. Sources of gains in horizontal mergers: Evidence from customer, supplier, and rival firms, Journal of Financial Economics 74(3):423–460. Fridolfsson, S. O., and J. Stennek. 2005. Why mergers reduce profits and raise share prices - A theory of preemptive mergers, Journal of the European Economic Association 3(5):1083–1104. Fridolfsson, S. O., and J. Stennek. 2010, Industry concentration and welfare: On the use of stock market evidence from horizontal mergers, Economica 77, 308:734–750. JFE Holdings, Inc. 2001. Consolidation of entire business between Kawasaki Steel and NKK, News release, http://www.jfe-holdings.co.jp/en/release/2001/010413.html [Accessed 4.13.2013] Kawahama, N. 2008. Kigyo-Ketsugo-Guidelines-Gaisetsu (in: N. Kawahama -ed., Kigyo-Ketsugo- Guidelines-no-Kaisetsu-to-Bunseki, Merger and Acquisition Guidelines Examination and Analysis), Shouji-Houmu. Japan, pp 1–50. McKinlay, A. C. 1997. Event studies in economics and finance, Journal of Economic Literature 35, 1: 13–39. McAfee, R. P and M. A. Williams. 1988. Can event studies detect anticompetitive mergers? Economics Letters 28: 199–203. METI. 2001 and 2002. Yearbook of machinery statistics, http://www.meti.go.jp/statistics/tyo/seidou/archives/pdf/H13/kikai_H13.pdf, http://www.meti.go.jp/statistics/tyo/seidou/archives/pdf/H14/kikai_H14.pdf, [Accessed 12.15.2014] Mullin, G. L., Mullin, J. G., and W. P. Mullin. 1995. The competitive effects of mergers-Stock market evidence from the US Steel dissolution suit, Rand Journal of Economics 26(2): 314–330. Shahrur, H. 2005. Industry structure and horizontal takeovers: Analysis of wealth effects on rivals, suppliers, and corporate customers, Journal of Financial Economics 71(1): 61–98. Stillman, R. 1983. Examining antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers, Journal of Financial Economics 11: 225–240 Toyota Motor Corporation. Global website. A wave of restructuring and a push for changes in awareness. 75 years of TOYOTAhttp://www.toyota-global.com/company/history_of_toyota/75years/text/leaping_forward_as_a_global_corporation/chapter4/section7/item1.html [Accessed 12.15.2014] Whinston, M. D. 2006. Lectures on Antitrust Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge. Williamson, O. E. 1968. Economies as an antitrust defense — Welfare tradeoffs, American Economic Review 58: 18–36. Yanagida, C. 2011. Kabuka-Event-Bunseki (in: Kigyo-Ketsugo-no-Jigo-Hyoka:Keizai-Bunseki-no-Kyoso-Seisaku-heno-Katsuyo), Research report CR 04-11. Competition Policy Research Centre, Japan Fair Trade Commission, Tokyo, Japan.