An optimal contract approach to hospital financing

Baron, D.P., 1989. Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions. In: Schmalensee, R., Willig, R.D. (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization. North-Holland, Amsterdam (Chapter 24). Chalkley, 1998, Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality, Journal of Health Economics, 17, 1, 10.1016/S0167-6296(97)00019-2 Custer, 1990, The production of health care services and changing hospital reimbursement. The role of hospital-medical staff relationships, Journal of Health Economics, 9, 167, 10.1016/0167-6296(90)90016-V Ellis, 1986, Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement, Journal of Health Economics, 5, 129, 10.1016/0167-6296(86)90002-0 Laffont, 1998, Collusion and delegation, Rand Journal of Economics, 29, 280, 10.2307/2555889 Macho-Stadler, I., Pérez-Castrillo, D., 1997. An Introduction to the Theory of Information: Incentives and Contracts. Oxford University Press, Oxford. McClellan, 1997, Hospital reimbursement incentives: an empirical analysis, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6, 91, 10.1162/105864097567048 Melumad, 1989, Delegation as commitment: the case of income tax audit, Rand Journal of Economics, 20, 139, 10.2307/2555686 Melumad, 1995, Hierarchical decentralization of incentive contracts, Rand Journal of Economics, 26, 654, 10.2307/2556011 Myerson, 1982, Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 67, 10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4