An incentive model for closed-loop supply chain under the EPR law
Tóm tắt
Motivated by the collection outsourcing phenomena under Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR), this paper studies a contract design problem for a manufacturer who consigns the used product collection to a collector, while the manufacturer only has incomplete information on the collector's cost. On the basis of the incentive theory, optimal contracts are developed to minimize the cost and satisfy the collection constraints prescribed by EPR. Properties of the contract parameters are derived, and issues such as information rent and information value are also explored. The impacts of EPR are analysed by comparing whether or not EPR law is implemented, and more managerial insights are further obtained through numerical examples.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Aras N, Verter V and Boyaci T (2006). Coordination and priority decisions in hybrid manufacturing/remanufacturing systems. Production and Operations Management 15 (4): 528–543.
Atasu A, Van Wassenhove LN and Sarvary M (2009). Efficient take-back legislation. Production and Operation Management 18 (3): 243–258.
Dekker R, Fleischmann M, Inderfurth K and Van Wassenhove LN (2004). Reverse Logistics: Quantitative Models for Closed-Loop Supply Chains. Springer: New York.
Driesch H and Flapper S (2005). Recovery of car engines: The Mercedes-benz case. In: Flapper S, Van Nunen J and Van Wassenhove LN (eds). Managing Closed-Loop Supply Chains. Springer: New York.
Guide Jr. VDR and Van Wassenhove LN (2009). The evolution of closed-loop supply chain research. Operations Research 57 (1): 10–18.
Ilgin MA and Gupta SM (2010). Environmentally conscious manufacturing and product recovery (ECMPRO): A review of the state of the art. Journal of Environmental Management 91 (3): 563–591.
Karakayali I, Emir-Farinas H and Akcali E (2007). An analysis of decentralized collection and processing of end-of-life products. Journal of Operations Management 25 (6): 1161–1183.
Kaya O (2010). Incentive and production decisions for remanufacturing operations. European Journal of Operational Research 201 (2): 442–453.
Laffont J and Martimort D (2001). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press: Princeton.
Plambeck E and Wang Q (2009). Effects of e-waste regulation on new product introduction. Management Science 55 (3): 333–347.
Savaskan C and Van Wassenhove LN (2006). Reverse channel design: The case of competing retailers. Management Science 52 (1): 1–14.
Savaskan C, Bhattacharya S and Van Wassenhove LN (2004). Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing. Management Science 50 (2): 239–252.
Subramanian R, Gupta S and Talbot B (2009). Product design and supply chain coordination under extended producer responsibility. Production and Operation Management 18 (3): 259–277.
Toktay LB, Wein M and Zenios SA (2000). Inventory management of remanufacturable products. Management Science 46 (11): 1412–1426.
Toyasaki F, Boyaci T and Verter V (2011). An analysis of monopolistic and competitive take-back schemes for WEEE recycling. Production and Operation Management 20 (6): 805–823.
Webster S and Mitra S (2007). Competitive strategy in remanufacturing and the impact of take-back laws. Journal of Operations Management 25 (6): 1123–1140.