An economic analysis of court fees: evidence from the Spanish civil jurisdiction

Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2009). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s companion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Buonanno, P., & Galizzi, M. M. (2012). Advocatus, et non latro? Testing the Supplier-induced-demand hypothesis for Italian courts of justice. Carlo Alberto Notebooks, 250.

Carmignani, A., & Giacomelli, S. (2010). Too many Lawyers? Litigation in Italian Civil Courts. Temi di Discussione 745. Banca d ́Italia.

CEPEJ—European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice. (2016). European judicial systems. Efficiency and quality of justice. Edition 2016 (2014 data). CEPEJ STUDIES No. 23.

Chappe, N. (2012). Demand for civil trials and court congestion. European Journal of Law and Economics, 33, 343–357.

Chaves García, J. R. (2013). La economía procesal como contrapeso a las tasas judiciales y otras rémoras. Actualidad Jurídica Aranzadi, 855, 3.

Chemin, M. (2012). Does court speed shape economic activity? Evidence from a court reform in India. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 28(3), 460–485.

Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. The Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44.

Doménech, G. (2017). Las tasas judiciales a juicio. Comentario crítico de la Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional 140/2016, de 21 de julio. Indret, enero 2017.

Eisenberg, T., Kalantry, S., & Robinson, N. (2013). Litigation as a measure of well-being. DePaul Law Review, 62, 247–292.

Esposito, G., Lanau, S., & Pompe, S. (2014). Judicial system reform in Italy—A key to growth. IMF working papers 14/32, International Monetary Fund.

Esteller-Moré, A. (2002). La configuración de una tasa judicial: Análisis teórico. Investigaciones Económicas, 26(3), 525–549.

Fon, V., Parisi, F., & Depoorter, B. (2005). Litigation, judicial path- dependence, and legal change. European Journal of Law and Economics, 20(1), 43–56.

García-Posada, M., & Mora-Sanguinetti, J. S. (2014). Entrepreneurship and enforcement institutions: Disaggregated evidence for Spain. European Journal of Law and Economics, 40(1), 49–74.

García-Posada, M., & Mora-Sanguinetti, J. S. (2015). Does (average) size matter? Court enforcement, business demography and firm growth. Small Business Economics Journal, 44(3), 639–669.

Giacomelli, S., & Menon, C. (2017). Does weak contract enforcement affect firm size? Evidence from the neighbour’s court. Journal of Economic Geography, 17(61), 1251–1282.

Ginsburg, T., & Hoetker, G. (2006). The unreluctant litigant? An empirical analysis of Japan’s turn to litigation. The Journal of Legal Studies, 35, 31–59.

Hanssen, F. (1999). The effects of judicial institutions on uncertainty and the rates of litigation: The election versus appointment of state judges. The Journal of Legal Studies, 28, 205–232.

Hodges, C., Vogenauer, S., & Tulibacka, M. (Eds.). (2010). The costs and funding of civil litigation: A comparative perspective. London: Hart Publishing.

Jappelli, T., Pagano, M., & Bianco, M. (2005). Courts and banks: effects of judicial enforcement on credit markets. Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 37, 224–244.

Johnson, S., McMillan, J., & Woodruff, C. (2002). Courts and relational contracts. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 18(1), 221–277.

Maher, B. S. (2010). The civil judicial subsidy. Indiana Law Journal, 85, 1527–1556.

Martínez-Matute, M., & Mora-Sanguinetti, J. S. (2017). Un análisis económico de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa: El efecto del nuevo criterio de costas y las tasas judiciales. Papeles de Economía Española, 151, 88–101.

Mery Nieto, R. (2015). Court fees: Charging the user as a way to mitigate judicial congestion. The Latin American and Iberian Journal of Law and Economics, 1(1), Article 7.

Mokyr, J. (2010). Entrepreneurship and the industrial revolution in Britain. In D. S. Landes, J. Mokyr, & W. J. Baumol (Eds.), The invention of enterprise: Entrepreneurship from ancient mesopotamia to modern times. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mora-Sanguinetti, J. S. (2010). A characterization of the judicial system in Spain: Analysis with formalism indices. Economic Analysis of Law Review, 1(2), 210–240.

Mora-Sanguinetti, J. S. (2013). El funcionamiento del sistema judicial: Nueva evidencia comparada. Boletín Económico-Banco de España, 11, 57–67.

Mora-Sanguinetti, J. S., & Garoupa, N. (2015). Do lawyers induce litiga- tion? Evidence from Spain, 2001–2010. International Review of Law and Economics, 44(29), 41.

Mora-Sanguinetti, J. S., Martínez-Matute, M., & García-Posada, M. (2017). Credit, crisis and contract enforcement: Evidence from the Spanish loan market. European Journal of Law and Economics, 44(2), 361–383.

Mora-Sanguinetti, J. S., & Spruk, R. (2018). Industry versus services: Do enforcement institutions matter for specialization patterns? Disaggregated evidence from Spain. Working paper 1812 Banco de España.

North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

North, D. C. (1994). Performance through time. The American Economic Review, 84, 359–368.

Nunn, N. (2007). Relationship-specificity, incomplete contracts and the pattern of trade. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), 569–600.

Palumbo, G., Giupponi, G., Nunziata, L., & Mora-Sanguinetti, J. S. (2013a). The economics of civil justice: New cross-country data and empirics. OECD Economics Department working papers no. 1060.

Palumbo, G., Giupponi, G., Nunziata, L., & Mora-Sanguinetti, J. S. (2013b). Judicial performance and its determinants: A cross-country perspective. OECD economic policy paper no. 5.

Rickman, N., & Tzavara, D. (2005). Optimal pricing of court services. European Journal of Law and Economics, 20(1), 31–41.

Rosales, V., & Jiménez-Rubio, D. (2017). Empirical analysis of civil litigation determinants: The Case of Spain. European Journal of Law and Economics, 44(2), 321–338.

Shavell, S. (1982). Suit, settlement and trial: A theoretical analysis under alternative methods for the allocation of legal costs. The Journal of Legal Studies, 11(1), 55–81.

Shavell, S. (1997). The fundamental divergence between the private and the social motive to use the legal system. The Journal of Legal Studies, 26(2), 575–612.

Shvets, J. (2013). Judicial institutions and firms’ external finance: Evidence from Russia. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 29(4), 735–764.

Vereeck, L., & Mühl, M. (2000). An economic theory of court delay. European Journal of Law and Economics, 10(3), 243–268.

Viguer Soler, P. L. (2010). Algunas propuestas para la reducción de la litigiosidad y la agilización de los procedimientos. La Ley 8789/2010.

Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge: MIT Press Books, The MIT Press.