An Invariant Content Theory for Epistemic Uses of Modal Terms
Tóm tắt
I propose and defend an account on which the semantic content of propositions expressed by utterances making use of modals epistemically is constant; i.e., invariant. Although such proposals are typically considered non-starters, I aim to show that combining such a semantics with a performative account in which such utterances perform two speech acts is quite promising. I argue that a performative account, when combined with an invariant semantic content theory, does a good job of accounting for ordinary intuitions in some of the standard test cases discussed in the literature. I further show that the contextualist has a little noticed problem with how a single speaker is able to consider the same epistemic possibility proposition over time. An invariant position has no such problem, and I argue that this counts strongly in its favor.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Austin J (1975) How to do things with words. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Austin J (1979) Performative utterances. In: Urmson J, Warnock G (eds) Philosophical papers. Oxford University Press, New York
Bach K (2011) Perspectives on possibilities: contextualism, relativism, or what. In: Egan A, Weatherson B (eds) Epistemic modality. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Bojrnsson G, Almer A (2011) The pragmatics of insensitive assessments: understanding the relativity of assessments of judgments of personal taste, epistemic modals, and more. Baltic Int Yearbook Cogn Logic Commun 6:1–45
Braun D (2012) An invariantist theory of ‘might’ might be right. Linguist Philos 35:461–489
Brogaard B (2008) In defence of a perspectival semantics for ‘know’. Aust J Philos 86:439–459
Cappelen H, Hawthorne J (2009) Relativism and monadic truth. Oxford University Press, New York
DeRose K (1991) Epistemic possibilities. Philos Rev 4:581–605
Dowell J (2011) A flexible contextualist account of epistemic modals. Philos Impr 11:1–25
Egan A (2007) Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion. Philos Stud 133:1–22
Egan A, Hawthorne J, Weatherson B (2005) Epistemic modals in context. In: Preyer G, Peter G (eds) Contextualism in philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Kratzer A (1977) What ‘must’ and ‘can’ must and can mean. Linguist Philos 1:337–355
Lyons J (1977) Semantics. Cambridge University Press, London
MacFarlane K (2011) Epistemic modals are assessment sensitive. In: Egan A, Weatherson B (eds) Epistemic modality. Oxford University Press, Oxford
MacFarlane J (2014) Assessment sensitivity: relative truth and its applications. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Papafragou A (2006) Epistemic modality and truth conditions. Lingua 116:1688–1702
Portner P (2009) Modality. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Sackris D (2014) It might not be that cloudy. Pol J Philos 8:67–84
Schnieder B (2010) Expressivism concerning epistemic modals. Philos Quart 60:601–615
Searle J (2001) Indirect speech acts. In: Martinich A (ed) The philosophy of language. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Stephenson T (2007) Judge dependence, epistemic modals, and predicates of personal taste. Linguist Philos 30:487–525
Swanson E (2011) How not to theorize about the language of subjective uncertainty. In: Egan A, Weatherson B (eds) Epistemic modality. Oxford University Press, Oxford
von Fintel K, Gillies A (2007) CIA Leaks. Philos Rev 117:77–98
von Fintel K, Gillies A (2011) ‘Might’ made right. In: Egan A, Weatherson B (eds) Epistemic modality. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Yalcin S (2007) Epistemic modals. Mind 116:983–1026