America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective

Constitutional Political Economy - Tập 19 - Trang 35-59 - 2008
Roger D. Congleton1
1Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, Fairfax, USA

Tóm tắt

America’s early constitutional development owes a good deal to the experience and policies of the Dutch republic. Many of the parallels are direct: In the late 16th century, the Dutch fought a successful war to secede from a major empire. They wrote a declaration of independence and adopted a federal model of Republican governance almost exactly two hundred years before the Americans. Somewhat later, the Dutch republic and its political institutions subsequently inspired and protected enlightenment scholars. Its leading political family and army played a crucial role in curtailing English absolutism in England and in England’s American colonies, and its federal template provided a model for early American institutions.

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