Airport Congestion When Carriers Have Market Power

American Economic Review - Tập 92 Số 5 - Trang 1357-1375 - 2002
Jan K. Brueckner1
1Department of Economics and Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1206 South Sixth Street, Champaign, IL 61820.

Tóm tắt

This paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic, showing how the results of the road-pricing literature are modified when the economic agents causing congestion have market power. The analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist, congestion is fully internalized, yielding no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions. Under a Cournot oligopoly, however, carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves. A toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion may then improve the allocation of traffic. The analysis is supported by some rudimentary empirical evidence.

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

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Thông tin xuất bản

American Economic Review

Tập 92 Số 5

1357-1375

Thông tin tác giả