Agent’s liability versus principal’s liability when attitudes toward risk differ

Arlen, 1994, The potentially perverse effects of corporate criminal liability, Journal of Legal Studies, 23, 833, 10.1086/467947 Arlen, 1997, Controlling corporate misconduct, New York University Law Review, 72, 687 Byam, 1982, The economic inefficiency of corporate liability, Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 73, 582, 10.2307/1143108 Chu, 1995, Vicarious liability under a negligence rule, International Review of Law and Economics, 15, 305, 10.1016/0144-8188(95)00016-2 Cohen, 1991, Corporate crime and punishment, Boston University Law Review, 71, 247 Cremer, 1994, Tax evasion, concealment and the optimal linear income tax, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 96, 219, 10.2307/3440600 Dewatripont, 1999, Advocates, Journal of Political Economy, 107, 1, 10.1086/250049 Erard, 1997, Self-selection with measurement errors—a microeconometric analysis of the decision to seek tax assistance and its implications for tax compliance, Journal of Econometrics, 81, 319, 10.1016/S0304-4076(97)86570-0 Ehrlich, 1972, Market insurance, self-insurance and self-protection, Journal of Political Economy, 80, 623, 10.1086/259916 Fischel, 1996, Corporate crime, Journal of Legal Studies, 25, 319, 10.1086/467980 Khanna, 1996, Corporate criminal liability, Harvard Law Review, 109, 1477, 10.2307/1342023 Klepper, 1991, Expert intermediaries and legal compliance, Journal of Law and Economics, 34, 205, 10.1086/467224 Kraakman, 1989, Corporate liability strategies and the costs of legal controls, Yale Law Journal, 93, 857, 10.2307/796101 Kraakman, 1986, Gatekeepers, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2, 53 Lee, 1998, Risk aversion and self-insurance-cum-protection, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 17, 139, 10.1023/A:1007719629165 Polinsky, 1993, Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability?, International Review of Law and Economics, 13, 239, 10.1016/0144-8188(93)90035-4 Posner, 1992 Privileggi, F., Marchese, C., & Cassone, A. (1998). Risk attitudes and the shift of liability from the principal to the agent. Working Paper N. 1 of the Dept. of Public Policy and Public Choice “Polis”, Alessandria, Italy. Reinganum, 1991, Equilibrium enforcement and compliance in the presence of tax practitioners, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, 163 Shavell, 1982, On liability and insurance, Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 120, 10.2307/3003434 Shavell, 1997, The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees, International Review of Law and Economics, 17, 203, 10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00003-3 Stigler, 1970, The optimal enforcement of law, Journal of Political Economy, 78, 526, 10.1086/259646 Sykes, 1984, The economics of vicarious liability, Yale Law Journal, 93, 1231, 10.2307/796257 Tirole, J. (1992). Collusion and the theory of organizations. In J. J. Laffont (ed.): Advances in economic theory, sixth world congress, vol. II (pp. 151–206). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Yitzhaki, 1987, On the excess burden of tax evasion, Public Finance Quarterly, 15, 123, 10.1177/109114218701500201