Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice - Tập 27 Số 4 - Trang 367-382 - 2003
Randall Mørck1, Bernard Yeung2
1University of Alberta School of Business;
2Stern School of Business of New York University.

Tóm tắt

Greater managerial ownership in family firms need not mitigate agency problems, especially when each family controls a group of publicly traded and private firms, as is the case in most countries. Such structures give rise to their own set of agency problems, as managers act for the controlling family, but not for shareholders in general. For example, to avoid what we call “creative self–destruction,” a family might quash innovation in one firm to protect its obsolete investment in another. At present, we do not know whether these agency problems are more or less serious impediments to general prosperity than those afflicting widely held firms.

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

Aghion P., 1997, Endogenous growth theory

Agnblad J., 2001, The control of corporate Europe, 228

Barca F., 2001, The control of corporate Europe

Bebchuk L.A., 2000, Concentrated corporate ownership, 295

Berle A.A., 1932, Jr.

10.3386/w7952

10.1177/104225879902300404

10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00067-2

Daniels R.J., 1995, Corporate decision making in Canada, 223

10.2307/3069338

Herrnstein R.J., 1994, The bell curve: Intelligence and class structure in American life

10.2307/2118337

10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X

10.1257/aer.90.2.22

10.1016/0165-4101(85)90034-5

Krueger A.O., 1974, American Economic Review, 64, 291

10.1111/0022-1082.00115

10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x

10.1086/250042

Morck R., 1995, Canadian Business Law Journal, 26, 63

10.1016/0304-405X(88)90048-7

10.7208/chicago/9780226536828.001.0001

10.1086/261641

Olson M., 1963, Jr., 23, 552

Olson M., 1982, Jr.

Olson M., 2000, Jr.

10.1086/261420

10.1287/orsc.12.2.99.10114

Schumpeter J.A., 1912, Theorie der wirtschaftlichen entwichlung, Leipzig, Dunker und Humbolt. Translation by R. Opie (1934), The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle

Schumpeter J.A., 1942, Capitalism, socialism, and democracy

Shleifer A., 1988, Corporate takeovers: Causes and consequences, 33

10.1086/261385

10.1016/0304-405X(89)90099-8

10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x

Veblen T., 1899, The theory of the leisure class; an economic study in the evolution of institutions

Veblen T., 1920, The vested interests and the common man: The modern point of view and the new order

Thông tin
Thông tin xuất bản

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice

Tập 27 Số 4

367-382

Thông tin tác giả