Actualism Doesn’t Have Control Issues: A Reply to Cohen and Timmerman
Tóm tắt
Recently, Cohen and Timmerman (Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 10(3), 1–18, 2016) argue that actualism has control issues. The view should be rejected, they claim, as it recognizes a morally irrelevant distinction between counterfactuals over which agents exercise the same kind of control. Here we reply on behalf of actualism.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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