A theory of hierarchies based on limited managerial attention

John Geanakoplos1,2, Paul Milgrom1,2
1Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520, USA
2Stanford University Stanford, California 94305 USA

Tài liệu tham khảo

Beckmann, 1977, Management production functions and the theory of the firm, J. Econ. Theory, 14, 1, 10.1016/0022-0531(77)90081-3 Calvo, 1978, Supervision, loss of control and the optimal size of the firm, J. Polit. Econ., 87, 943, 10.1086/260719 Cremer, 1980, A partial theory of the optimal organization of bureaucracy, Bell J. Econ., 11, 683, 10.2307/3003387 Keren, 1983, The internal organization of the firm and the shape of average costs, Bell J. Econ., 14, 474, 10.2307/3003648 Marschak, 1972 Milgrom, 1983, Organizing Production in a Large Economy with Costly Communication, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper Rosen, 1982, Authority, control and the distribution of earnings, Bell J. Econ., 13, 311, 10.2307/3003456 Simon, 1976 Williamson, 1967, Hierarchical control and optimum firm size, J. Polit. Econ., 75, 123, 10.1086/259258 Williamson, 1985