A theory of credit cards

International Journal of Industrial Organization - Tập 25 Số 3 - Trang 583-595 - 2007
Sujit Chakravorti1, Ted To2
1Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 230 S. LaSalle Street, Chicago, IL 60604, United States
2Bureau of Labor Statistics, Room 3105, 2 Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington, DC 20212, United States

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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