A note on the characterizations of the compromise value
Tóm tắt
In Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn and Tijs (1992) the compromise value is introduced as a solution concept on the class of compromise admissible NTU-games. Two characterizations of the compromise value are provided on subclasses of NTU-games. This note shows that in one of these characterizations the axioms are dependent. As a result of this observation a new characterization of the compromise value is provided. Moreover, it turns out that with a small weakening of the symmetry property the axioms in the original characterization become independent. Further, it is shown that these characterizations can be extended to a larger class of NTU-games. Finally, all monotonic, Pareto optimal, and covariant values on this class of NTU-games are described.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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