A model of insurance markets with incomplete information

Journal of Economic Theory - Tập 16 Số 2 - Trang 167-207 - 1977
Charles Wilson1
1Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, USA.

Tóm tắt

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

Akerlof, 1976, The economics of caste and of the rat race and other woeful tales, Quart. J. Econ., 90, 599, 10.2307/1885324

Jaffee, 1976, Imperfect information, uncertainty, and credit rationing, Quart. J. Econ., 90, 651, 10.2307/1885327

Jaynes, 1976

Pauly, 1974, Over insurance and public provision of insurance: Roles of moral hazard and adverse selection, Quart. J. Econ., 88, 44, 10.2307/1881793

Riley, 1975, Competitive signalling, J. Econ. Theory, 10, 174, 10.1016/0022-0531(75)90049-6

Riley, 1976, Informational Equilibrium

Rothschild, 1975, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets

Rothschild, 1976, Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay in the economics of imperfect information, Quart. J. Econ., 90, 629, 10.2307/1885326

Spence, 1973, Job market signalling, Quart. J. Econ., 87, 355, 10.2307/1882010

Spence, 1974

J. Stiglitz, Unpublished Note, Stanford University, 1974.

Wilson, 1973

Wilson, 1976, Equilibrium in a Class of Self-Selection Models