A local regulator's rewards for conformity in policy
Tóm tắt
This note is an empirical investigation of the benefits that accrue to local building departments for a regulatory policy that conforms to the relative strength of local interest groups. The study uses an interest group model and applies it to data for building departments in 1100 municipalities. It finds that material benefits in terms of budgets and salaries go to building agencies which set a strictness of regulation that reflects the balance of interest group strengths in the locality.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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