A-equilibrium and fuzzy A-core in pure exchange model with externalities
Tóm tắt
The paper suggests the concept of A-equilibrium that is a concretization of the “altruistic” Berge equilibrium adapted to the pure exchange models with externalities. In contrast to the classical markets, these models consider the external influence on the preferences of economic agents. In terms of an appropriate fuzzy domination, a cooperative characterization of the A-equilibrium allocations is given, and an analog of the classic core equivalence theorem is established.
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