A constitutional theory of public enterprise
Tóm tắt
This article rationalizes public enterprise by analyzing the constitutional choice between private and public ownership of production arrangements. Arguing that results depend on who does the choosing, the article compares choices by self-governing citizens with choices by self-directed governmental officials. The resulting institutional theory identifies four conditions that cause citizens to favor public over private ownership. None of the conditions refers to the standard concept of economic efficiency, which guides most economic comparisons of public and private enterprise.
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