A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm
Tóm tắt
Từ khóa
Tài liệu tham khảo
Delpech, 1982
Demazure, 1979, Calcul différentiel
Guesnerie, 1981, On taxation and incentives: Further reflections on the limits to redistribution
Guesnerie, 1984, Indirect public control of self-managed monopolies, Journal of Comparative Economics, 8, 139, 10.1016/0147-5967(84)90003-9
Guesnerie, 1984, The government control of public firms and the economics of incomplete information: an introduction
Hadley, 1971
Hammond, 1979, Straightforward individual incentives compatibility in large economies, Review of Economic Studies Symposium, 263, 10.2307/2297050
Laffont, 1980, A differential approach to dominant strategy mechanisms, Econometrica, 1507, 10.2307/1912821
Laffont, 1982, The theory of incentives: An overview
Laffont, 1984
Lollivier, 1983, Bunching and second order conditions: A note on optimal tax theory, Journal of Economic Theory, 31, 392, 10.1016/0022-0531(83)90086-8
Maskin, 1982, Monopoly selling strategies with incomplete information
Mirrlees, 1971, An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation, Review of Economic Studies, 38, 175, 10.2307/2296779
Mussa, 1978, Monopoly and product quality, Journal of Economic Theory, 18, 301, 10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6
Rees, 1982, Principal-agent theory and public enterprise control, an international seminar on public enterprise
Spence, 1974, Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution, Journal of Economic Theory, 7, 196, 10.1016/0022-0531(74)90098-2
Thompson, 1982, Information and incentives in labour-managed economies, Journal of Comparative Economics, 6
Vanek, 1970
Ward, 1958, The firm in Illyria: Market syndicalism, American Economic Review, 48, 566