A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences

Mathematical Social Sciences - Tập 55 - Trang 299-304 - 2008
Haixiang Yao1, Jianxin Yi2
1School of Information Science and Technology, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou 510006, China
2School of Mathematic Sciences, South China Normal University, Guangzhou 510631, China

Tài liệu tham khảo

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