A Stackelberg game-based approach for interactions among Internet service providers and content providers
Tóm tắt
This paper studies non-neutral market share where Internet service providers (ISPs) charge content providers (CPs) for the content delivery. Each provider seeks to maximize its own profit by determining its price and their service qualities (quality of service and credibility of content). First, we utilize a Stackelberg game to study the interactions between ISPs and CPs. We formulate the interactions among multiple ISPs (multiple CPs) as a non-cooperative game. In turn, the subscribers’ demand for the service of a provider depends not only on their strategies, but also upon those proposed by all of its competitors. Then we provide some interesting results regarding the Nash equilibrium of this game. More precisely, we show existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium under some conditions. An iterative and distributed algorithm based on best response dynamics is proposed to achieve the equilibrium point; additionally, in order to quantify how efficient the Nash equilibrium point is, a detailed analysis of the Price of Anarchy is adopted to evaluate the performance of the system at equilibrium. Finally, extensive simulations show convergence of a proposed schema to the Nash equilibrium and show the effect of side payment on providers’ policies and the effect of bandwidth cost on ISPs’ policies.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Ait Omar, D., El Amrani, M., Baslam, M., Fakir, M. (2019). A game-theoretic approach for the internet content distribution chain. In Podelski, A., & Taïani, F. (Eds.) Networked systems, (Vol. 11028 pp. 270–285). Cham : Springer International Publishing.
Ait Omar, D., Outanoute, M., Baslam, M., Fakir, M., Bouikhalne, B. (2017). Joint price and QoS competition with bounded rational customers. In El Abbadi, A., & Garbinato, B. (Eds.) Networked Systems: 5th international conference, NETYS 2017, Marrakech, Morocco, May 17-19, 2017, Proceedings (pp. 457–471). Cham.
Altman, E. (2012). In which content to specialize? a game theoretic analysis. In International conference on research in networking (pp. 121–125): Springer.
Altman, E., Bernhard, P., Caron, S., Kesidis, G., Rojas-Mora, J., Wong, S. (2010). A study of non-neutral networks with usage-based prices. In Incentives, overlays, and economic traffic control (pp. 76–84): Springer.
Altman, E., Legout, A., Xu, Y. (2011). Network non-neutrality debate: an economic analysis. In International conference on research in networking (pp. 68–81): Springer.
Azouzi, R.E., Altman, E., Wynter, L. (2003). Telecommunications network equilibrium with price and quality-of-service characteristics. In Teletraffic science and engineering, (Vol. 5 pp. 369–378).
Baslam, M., Echabbi, L., El-Azouzi, R., Sabir, E. (2012). Joint price and QoS market share game with adversarial service providers and migrating customers. In Jain, R., & Kannan, R. (Eds.) Game theory for networks: 2nd international ICST conference, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2011, Revised selected papers (pp. 642–657). Berlin: Springer .
Baslam, M., El-Azouzi, R., Sabir, E., Echabbi, L., Bouyakhf, E. (2013). A game theoretic analysis of price-QoS market share in presence of adversarial service providers. In Hanappi, H. (Ed.) Game theory relaunched. InTech (pp. 157–172).
Brun, O., Prabhu, B.J., Seregina, T. (2013). On the convergence of the best-response algorithm in routing games. Proceedings of the 7th international conference on performance evaluation methodologies and tools (pp. 136–144). ICST (Institute for computer sciences, social-informatics and telecommunications engineering).
Cisco, V.N.I. (2016). Cisco VNI forecast and methodology, 2015-2020. Retrieved.
Crowcroft, J. (2007). Net neutrality: the technical side of the debate: a white paper. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 37(1), 49–56.
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game theory. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Garmani, H., Outanoute, M., Baslam, M., Jourhmane, M. (2019). New competition-based approach for caching popular content in ICN. In Podelski, A., & Taïani, F. (Eds.) Networked systems, (Vol. 11028 pp. 286–300). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Garrett, T., Dustdar, S., Bona, L.C.E., Duarte, E.P. (2017). Ensuring network neutrality for future distributed systems. In 2017 IEEE 37th international conference on distributed computing systems (ICDCS) (pp. 1780–1786). Atlanta: IEEE.
Guijarro, L., Pla, V., Vidal, J.R., Martinez-Bauset, J. (2011). Analysis of price competition under peering and transit agreements in Internet Service provision to peer-to-peer users. In 2011 IEEE consumer communications and networking conference (CCNC) (pp. 1145–1149).
Handouf, S., Sabir, E., Sadik, M. (2016). A pricing-based spectrum leasing framework with adaptive distributed learning for cognitive radio networks. In Advances in ubiquitous networking (pp. 39–51). Singapore: Springer.
Jiménez, T., Hayel, Y., Altman, E. (2012). Competition in access to content. Networking, 2012, 211–222.
Koutsoupias, E., & Papadimitriou, C. (1999). Worst-case equilibria. In Annual symposium on theoretical aspects of computer science (pp. 404–413): Springer.
Laffont, J., Marcus, S., Rey, P., Tirole, J. (2003). Internet interconnection and the off-net-cost pricing principle. The RAND Journal of Economics, 34(2), 370–390.
Lasaulce, S., Debbah, M., Altman, E. (2009). Methodologies for analyzing equilibria in wireless games. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 26(5), 41–52.
Maskin, E. (1999). Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. The Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 23–38.
Musacchio, J., Schwartz, G., Walrand, J. (2011). Network economics: neutrality, competition, and service differentiation. In Ramamurthy, B., Rouskas, G., Sivalingam, K. (Eds.) Next-generation internet: Architectures and protocols (pp. 378–402): Cambridge University Press.
Musacchio, J., Walrand, J., Schwartz, G. (2007). Network neutrality and provider investment incentives. In Conference record of the forty-first Asilomar conference on signals, systems and computers, 2007. ACSSC 2007 (pp. 1437–1444): IEEE.
Nagurney, A., Li, D., Wolf, T., Saberi, S. (2013). A network economic game theory model of a service-oriented internet with choices and quality competition, (Vol. 14 pp. 1–25).
Omar, D.A., Garmani, H., El Amrani, M., Baslam, M., Fakir, M. (2019). Analyzing the customers– dynamic confusion in telecommunication networks share game. In International Journal of Business Data Communications and Networking, (Vol. 15 pp. 15–34).
Outanoute, M., Baslam, M., Bouikhalene, B. (2015). Genetic algorithm learning of Nash equilibrium: application on Price-QoS competition in telecommunications market. J. Electron. Commer. Organ., 13(3), 1–14.
Perlaza, S.M., Tembine, H., Lasaulce, S., Quintero-Florez, V. (2010). On the fictitious play and channel selection games. In 2010 IEEE Latin-American conference on communications (LATINCOM) (pp. 1–6): IEEE.
Reiffers-Masson, A., Hayel, Y., Altman, E. Pricing agreement between service and content providers: a net neutrality issue. arXiv:1505.03555.
Rosen, J.B. (1965). Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave N-Person games. Econometrica, 33(3), 520–534.
Saberi, S., Nagurney, A., Wolf, T. (2014). A network economic game theory model of a service-oriented internet with price and quality competition in both content and network provision. Service Science, 6(4), 229–250.
Sabir, E., El-Azouzi, R., Kavitha, V., Hayel, Y., Bouyakhf, E.-H. (2009). Stochastic learning solution for constrained Nash equilibrium throughput in non saturated wireless collision channels. In: Proceedings of the fourth international ICST conference on performance evaluation methodologies and tools (p. 61). ICST (Institute for computer sciences, social-informatics and telecommunications engineering).
Tirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Zhang, C., Gu, B., Liu, Z., Yamori, K., Tanaka, Y. (2017). A Stackelberg game based analysis for interactions among Internet service provider, content provider, and advertisers. In 2017 14th IEEE annual consumer communications & networking conference (CCNC) (pp. 231–235): IEEE.
Zhang, C., Gu, B., Yamori, K., Xu, S., Tanaka, Y. (2015). A novel Stackelberg-Bertrand game model for pricing content provider. In: Proceedings of the 8th international conference on mobile multimedia communications (pp. 128–132). ICST (Institute for computer sciences, social-informatics and telecommunications engineering).
Zhang, Z., Nabipay, P., Odlyzko, A., Guerin, R. (2010). Interactions, competition and innovation in a service-oriented internet: an economic model. In INFOCOM, 2010 Proceedings IEEE (pp. 1–5): IEEE.