A Simple Characterization of Assignment Mechanisms on Set Constraints

Ping Zhan1
1Department of Communication and Business, Edogawa University, Nagareyama, Japan

Tóm tắt

AbstractWe consider the problem of allocating divisible/indivisible goods to agents according to agents’ ordinal preferences. Hashimoto et al. [15] provided a nonalgorithmic and axiomatic characterization of well-studied probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism. Recently, Fujishige et al. [12] generalized the PS mechanism where goods are enlarged from a fixed set to a family of sets which is a polytope defined by a system of linear inequalities associated with submodular functions. The above extended PS (EPS) greatly improved the flexibility of allocations. Based on these two results, in this paper, we investigate the nonalgorithmic and axiomatic characterization of EPS. We show that the EPS rule is the only mechanism satisfying the ordinal fairness and a newly defined non-wastefulness. The submodularity plays a crucial role in our arguments.

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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