A Dissociation Between Two Cognitive Biases in Acute Stress Disorder: Preliminary Evidence for the Reverse Gambling Fallacy
Tóm tắt
Rationality biases, such as the gambling fallacy (e.g., predicting future coin-tosses based on previous tosses) and the famous “Linda” conjunction fallacy (estimating the conjunction that “Linda” is both teller and feminist based on her description) have not been examined in people suffering from acute stress disorder (ASD). We analyze potential outcomes and align them with different theories. To discern the precise pattern of rationality biases in persons with ASD, we examined performance on these 2 tasks within a month of the Hayian Super-Typhoon (August 27th, 2013). Out of a sample of 1001 persons, 82 had clinical ASD and their performance was compared to the remaining 919 participants. A specific link between ASD and rationality biases revealed that although conjunction task performance was not associated with ASD diagnosis, coin-task performance was. Namely, responding “Heads” to a 6th coin-toss after 5 successive “Heads” (reverse gambling fallacy) was robustly linked with ASD diagnosis. The results align with the bridging of trauma theories claiming that trauma symptoms are generated by disequilibrium following trauma exposure, with prospect theory’s notion of chance, which is conceived as belief in equilibrium restoration. Such disequilibrium following trauma exposure is thus linked with the belief underlying reverse gambling fallacy biases, namely “what-was-will-be”. Implications regarding themes important to address in therapy are mentioned.
Tài liệu tham khảo
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
Arnott, D. (2006). Cognitive biases and decision support systems development: A design science approach. Information Systems Journal, 16(1), 55–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2575.2006.00208.x.
Ayton, P., & Fischer, I. (2004). The hot hand fallacy and the gambler’s fallacy: Two faces of subjective randomness? Memory & Cognition, 32(8), 1369–1378.
Baddeley, A. (1998). Recent developments in working memory. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 8(2), 234–238.
Bard, M., & Sangrey, D. (1979). The crime Victim's book. New York: Basic Books.
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., & Van Ijzendoorn, M. H. (2007). Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and nonanxious individuals: A meta-analytic study. Psychological Bulletin, 133(1), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.1.
Ben-Ezra, M., Leshem, E., & Goodwin, R. (2015). In the wake of national trauma: Psychological reactions following the Charlie Hebdo terror attack. American Journal of Psychiatry, 172(8), 795–796.
Ben-Ezra, M., Hamama-Raz, Y., Mahat-Shamir, M., Pitcho-Prelorentzos, S., & Kaniasty, K. (2017). Shattering core beliefs: Psychological reactions to mass shooting in Orlando. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 85, 56–58.
Bensi, L., & Giusberti, F. (2007). Trait anxiety and reasoning under uncertainty. Personality and Individual Differences, 43(4), 827–838.
Botsford, J., Steinbrink, M., Rimane, E., Rosner, R., Steil, R., & Renneberg, B. (2019). Maladaptive post-traumatic cognitions in interpersonally traumatized adolescents with post-traumatic stress disorder: An analysis of “stuck-points”. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 43(1), 284–294.
Bryant, R. A., Creamer, M., O'Donnell, M., Silove, D., McFarlane, A. C., & Forbes, D. (2015). A comparison of the capacity of DSM-IV and DSM-5 acute stress disorder definitions to predict posttraumatic stress disorder and related disorders. The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 76(4), 391–397.
Croskerry, P., Singhal, G., & Mamede, S. (2013). Cognitive debiasing 1: Origins of bias and theory of debiasing. BMJ Quality & Safety, 22, ii58–ii64.
Derakshan, N., & Eysenck, M. W. (2010). Introduction to the special issue: Emotional states, attention, and working memory. Cognition and Emotion, 24(2), 189–199.
Epstein, S., Denes-Raj, V., & Pacini, R. (1995). The Linda problem revisited from the perspective of cognitive-experiential self-theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(11), 1124–1138.
Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in intuitive–experiential and analytical–rational thinking styles. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(2), 390–405.
Eysenck, M. W., Derekeshan, N., Santos, R., & Calvo, M. G. (2007). Anxiety and cognitive performance: Attentional control theory. Emotion, 7(2), 336–352.
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A. G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using G* power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavior Research Methods, 41(4), 1149–1160.
Feeney, A., Shafto, P., & Dunning, D. (2007). Who is susceptible to conjunction fallacies in category-based induction? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(5), 884–889.
Foa, E. B., & Kozak, M. J. (1986). Emotional processing of fear: Exposure to corrective information. Psychological Bulletin, 99(1), 20. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.99.1.20-35.
Foa, E. B., Steketee, G., & Rothbaum, B. O. (1989). Behavioral/cognitive conceptualizations of post-traumatic stress disorder. Behavior Therapy, 20(2), 155–176.
Frankl, V. E. (1969). The will to meaning. New York: New American Library.
Furukawa, T. A., Kessler, R. C., Slade, T., & Andrews, G. (2003). The performance of the K6 and K10 screening scales for psychological distress in the Australian National Survey of mental health and well-being. Psychological Medicine, 33(2), 357–362.
Gerhart, J. I., Canetti, D., & Hobfoll, S. E. (2015). Traumatic stress in overview: Definition, context, scope, and long-term outcomes. In Traumatic stress and long-term recovery (pp. 3–24). Cham: Springer.
Gilovich, T., Vallone, R., & Tversky, A. (1985). The hot hand in basketball: On the misperception of random sequences. Cognitive Psychology, 17(3), 295–314.
Grossman, E. S., Hoffman, Y. S., Berger, I., & Zivotofsky, A. Z. (2015). Beating their chests: University students with ADHD demonstrate greater attentional abilities on an inattentional blindness paradigm. Neuropsychology, 29(6), 882–887.
Hamama-Raz, Y., Palgi, Y., Leshem, E., Ben-Ezra, M., & Lavenda, O. (2017). Typhoon survivors' subjective wellbeing—A different view of responses to natural disaster. PLoS One, 12(9), e0184327.
Harvey, A. G., & Bryant, R. A. (1998). The relationship between acute stress disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder: A prospective evaluation of motor vehicle accident survivors. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 66(3), 507–512.
Hoe, S. L. (2008). Issues and procedures in adopting structural equation modeling technique. Journal of Applied Quantitative Methods, 3, 76–83.
Hoffman, Y., Shrira, A., Bodner, E., & Ben-Ezra, M. (2017). Prime and prejudice: The effect of priming context and prejudicial attitudes on post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms following immigrant violence. Psychiatry Research, 254, 224–231.
Horowitz, M. J. (2011). Stress response syndromes: PTSD, grief, adjustment, and dissociative disorders. Jason Aronson, Incorporated.
Horowitz, M. J. (2015). Effects of trauma on sense of self. Journal of Loss and Trauma, 20(2), 189–193.
Huber, J., Kirchler, M., & Stöckl, T. (2010). The hot hand belief and the gambler’s fallacy in investment decisions under risk. Theory and Decision, 68(4), 445–462.
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1985). The aftermath of victimization: Rebuilding shattered assumptions. Trauma and its wake, 1, 15–35.
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1992). Our fundamental assumptions: Shattered assumptions. The free press.
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1999). Rebuilding shattered assumptions after traumatic life events. Coping: The psychology of what works, 305–323.
Janoff-Bulman, R. (2010). Shattered assumptions. Simon and Schuster.
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. American Psychologist, 58(9), 697–720.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 430–454.
Kessler, R. C., Barker, P. R., Colpe, L. J., Epstein, J. F., Gfroerer, J. C., Hiripi, E., et al. (2003). Screening for serious mental illness in the general population. Archives of General Psychiatry, 60(2), 184–189.
Kleim, B., Ehlers, A., & Glucksman, E. (2012a). Investigating cognitive pathways to psychopathology: Predicting depression and posttraumatic stress disorder from early responses after assault. Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, 4(5), –527.
Kleim, B., Ehring, T., & Ehlers, A. (2012b). Perceptual processing advantages for trauma-related visual cues in post-traumatic stress disorder. Psychological Medicine, 42(1), 173–181.
Lavenda, O., Grossman, E. S., Ben-Ezra, M., & Hoffman, Y. (2017). Exploring DSM-5 criterion a in acute stress disorder symptoms following natural disaster. Psychiatry Research, 256, 458–460.
Leon, M. R., & Revelle, W. (1985). Effects of anxiety on analogical reasoning: A test of three theoretical models. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(5), 1302–1315.
Liberali, J. M., Reyna, V. F., Furlan, S., Stein, L. M., & Pardo, S. T. (2012). Individual differences in numeracy and cognitive reflection, with implications for biases and fallacies in probability judgment. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25(4), 361–381.
MacLaren, V., Ellery, M., & Knoll, T. (2015). Personality, gambling motives and cognitive distortions in electronic gambling machine players. Personality and Individual Differences, 73, 24–28.
McNally, R. J., & Foa, E. B. (1987). Cognition and agoraphobia: Bias in the interpretation of threat. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 11(5), 567–581.
Menzies, R. G., & Clarke, J. C. (1995). Danger expectancies and insight in acrophobia. Behavior Research and Therapy, 33(2), 215–221.
Michael, T., Ehlers, A., & Halligan, S. L. (2005). Enhanced priming for trauma-related material in posttraumatic stress disorder. Emotion, 5(1), 103–112.
Park, C. L., Riley, K. E., George, L. S., Gutierrez, I. A., Hale, A. E., Cho, D., & Braun, T. D. (2016). Assessing disruptions in meaning: Development of the global meaning violation scale. Cognitive Therapy & Research, 40(6), 831–846.
Pelster, M. (2020). The gambler’s and hot-hand fallacies: Empirical evidence from trading data. Economics Letters, 187, 108887.
Roney, C. J., & Trick, L. M. (2003). Grouping and gambling: A gestalt approach to understanding the gambler's fallacy. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale, 57(2), 69–75.
Roney, C. J., & Trick, L. M. (2009). Sympathetic magic and perceptions of randomness: The hot hand versus the gambler's fallacy. Thinking & Reasoning, 15(2), 197–210.
Rothbaum, B. O., & Davis, M. (2003). Applying learning principles to the treatment of post-trauma reactions. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1008(1), 112–121.
Smith, K., & Bryant, R. A. (2000). The generality of cognitive bias in acute stress disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38(7), 709–715.
Staab, J. P., Grieger, T. A., Fullerton, C. S., & Ursano, R. J. (1996). Acute stress disorder, subsequent posttraumatic stress disorder and depression after a series of typhoons. Anxiety, 2(5), 219–225.
Stanovich, K., & West, R. F. (1998). Individual differences in framing and conjunction effects. Thinking & Reasoning, 4(4), 289–317.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971). Belief in the law of small numbers. Psychological Bulletin, 76(2), 105–110.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124–1131.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extension versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review., 90(4), 293–315.
Warda, G., & Bryant, R. A. (1998). Cognitive bias in acute stress disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36(12), 1177–1183.
West, R. F., Toplak, M. E., & Stanovich, K. E. (2008). Heuristics and biases as measures of critical thinking: Associations with cognitive ability and thinking dispositions. Journal of Educational Psychology, 100(4), 930–941.