A Correspondence Theory of Exemplification

Axiomathes - Tập 23 - Trang 365-380 - 2012
Keith Hossack1
1Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK

Tóm tắt

What is exemplification? A proposition that attributes a property to an object is true if the object exemplifies the property. But according to the correspondence theory, a proposition is true if the corresponding fact exists. So if the correspondence theory is correct, an exemplification of a temporal property by an object is simply the concrete circumstance of the object’s having the property. But since not all properties are temporal, not all exemplifications are circumstances, and we need to recognise timeless as well as temporal facts. This distinction allows us to solve the problem of converse relations, and to give an account of the logically complex facts which deduction allows us to know.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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