Một Đặc Trưng của Chỉ Số Quyền Lực Banzhaf Thô Hoàn Toàn Trên Các Trò Chơi Bỏ Phiếu Hai Lựa Chọn Với Nhiều Mức Phê Duyệt Đầu Vào

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