Preferences for power

Journal of Public Economics - Tập 185 - Trang 104173 - 2020
Elena S. Pikulina1, Chloe Tergiman2
1Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, Canada
2Smeal College of Business, Pennsylvania State University, United States of America

Tài liệu tham khảo

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