Entry and espionage with noisy signals

Games and Economic Behavior - Tập 83 - Trang 127-146 - 2014
Alex Barrachina1, Yair Tauman2,3, Amparo Urbano4
1Department of Economics, University Carlos III, Madrid, Spain
2IDC Herzliya, Israel
3Stony Brook University, USA
4Department of Economic Analysis and ERI-CES, University of Valencia, Spain

Tài liệu tham khảo

Aghion, 1993, Dynamic duopoly with learning through market experimentation, Econ. Theory, 3, 517, 10.1007/BF01209700 Alepuz, 2005, Learning in asymmetric duopoly markets: competition in information and market correlation, Spanish Econ. Rev., 7, 209, 10.1007/s10108-005-0099-5 Billand, 2009 Biran, 2009 Caminal, 1990, A dynamic duopoly model with asymmetric information, J. Ind. Econ., 38, 315, 10.2307/2098501 Caminal, 1996, Why market shares matters: An information based theory, RAND J. Econ., 27, 221, 10.2307/2555924 Gal-Or, 1985, Information sharing in oligopoly, Econometrica, 329, 10.2307/1911239 Gal-Or, 1986, Information transmission: Cournot and Bertrand equilibria, Rev. Econ. Stud., 53, 85, 10.2307/2297593 Gal-Or, 1987, First mover disadvantages with private information, Rev. Econ. Stud., 279, 10.2307/2297517 Gal-Or, 1988, The advantages of imprecise information, RAND J. Econ., 19, 266, 10.2307/2555704 Ghemawat, 1984, Capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry, J. Ind. Econ., XXXIII, 145, 10.2307/2098506 Hall, 1990, An analysis of preemptive behavior in the titanium dioxide industry, Int. J. Ind. Organ., 8, 469, 10.1016/0167-7187(90)90008-O Harrington, 1986, Limit pricing when the potential entrant is uncertain of its cost function, Econometrica, 54, 429, 10.2307/1913161 Harrington, 1987, Oligopolistic entry deterrence under incomplete information, RAND J. Econ., 18, 211, 10.2307/2555548 Ho, 2008, Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing, J. Econ., 93, 31, 10.1007/s00712-007-0290-2 Mailath, 1989, Simultaneous signaling in an oligopoly model, Quart. J. Econ., 104, 417, 10.2307/2937856 Matsui, 1989, Information leakage forces cooperation, Games Econ. Behav., 1, 94, 10.1016/0899-8256(89)90007-9 Milgrom, 1982, Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence, J. Econ. Theory, 27, 280, 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-X Mirman, 1993, Duopoly signal-jamming, Econ. Theory, 3, 129, 10.1007/BF01213697 Nasheri, 2005 Provan, 2008 Raith, 1996, A general model of information sharing in oligopoly, J. Econ. Theory, 71, 260, 10.1006/jeth.1996.0117 Riordan, 1985, Imperfect information and dynamic conjectural variations, RAND J. Econ., 16, 41, 10.2307/2555587 Singer-Heruti Solan, 2004, Games with espionage, Games Econ. Behav., 47, 172, 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00177-5 Sull, 1999, Easyjet: the $550 million gamble, Europ. Manage. J., 17, 20, 10.1016/S0263-2373(98)00059-0 Vives, 1984, Duopoly information equilibria: Cournot and Bertrand, J. Econ. Theory, 34, 71, 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90162-5 Whitney, 1999, An inquiry into the rationale for economic espionage, Int. Econ. J., 13, 103, 10.1080/10168739900000040 Wilson, 1992, Strategic models of entry deterrence, 305, 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80013-X