Social Decision Heuristics in the Use of Shared Resources

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making - Tập 3 Số 3 - Trang 195-204 - 1990
Scott T. Allison1,2, David M. Messick3,4
1Scott T. Allison received his Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of California, Santa Barbara in 1987. He is currently Assistant Professor of Psychology at the University of Richmond. His research interests include social decision making and social inference processes.
2University of Richmond, U.S.A.
3David M. Messick received his Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, He is the author of numerous articles on decision making, attributions, and fairness biases. He is currently Professor of Psychology at the University of California, Santa Barbara.
4University of California, Santa Barbara, U.S.A.

Tóm tắt

AbstractThe goals of the present study were (1) to demonstrate again that subjects in social decision tasks involving shared resources cannot be modelled as strategic money maximizers, and (2) to investigate further factors that affect the use of what we have called social decision heuristics. Subjects were led to believe that they were the first of six group members to extract points from a common pool of points. Each point extracted could possibly be exchanged for cash. The independent variables were the magnitude of the payoffs that subjects could receive (high vs. low), the divisibility of the resource (divisible vs. nondivisible), the perceived control of the last members over the group's outcomes (fate control vs. no fate control), and subjects' social values (cooperative vs. noncooperative). The results indicated that subjects anchored their decisions on an equal division heuristic. Subjects withdrew the fewest number of points when the resource was divisible, the payoffs were low, and there was fate control. The most points were taken when the resource was nondivisible, the payoffs were high, and subjects were classified as noncooperative. A model of the choice process in this task is discussed.

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Thông tin
Thông tin xuất bản

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Tập 3 Số 3

195-204

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