Does one hat fit all? The case of corporate leadership structure

Anderson, C. A., & Anthony, R. N. (1986). The new corporate directors: Insights for board members and executives. New York: Whiley.

Baliga, R. B., Moyer, R. C., & Rao, R. S. (1996). CEO duality and firm performance: What’s the fuss? Strategic Management Journal, 17, 41–53.

Bebchuk, L. A., & Cohen, A. (2005). The costs of entrenched boards. Journal of Financial Economics, 78, 409–433.

Bethel, J. E., Liebeskind, J. P., & Opler, T. (1998). Block share purchases and corporate performance. Journal of Finance, 53, 605–634.

Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and long term performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27, 231–274.

Boone, A., Field, L. C., Karpoff, J., & Raheja, C. G. (2006). The determinants of board size and composition: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, in press.

Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Jarrell, G. (1997). Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman of the board. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3, 189–220.

Brickley, J., & James, C. (1987). The takeover market, corporate board composition, and ownership structure: The case of banking. Journal of Law & Economics, 30, 161–181.

Business Roundtable (2002) Principles of corporate governance. Retrieved from http://www.brtable.org/pdf/704.pdf.

Callahan, W. T., Millar, J. A., & Schulman, C. (2003). An analysis of the effect of management participation in director selection on the long-term performance of the firm. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9, 169–181.

Dahya, J. 2004. One man two hats—What’s all the commotion! Working paper, Baruch College.

Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. (1998). Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 19, 269–290.

Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1999). Number of directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 42, 674–686.

Davidson, W. N., Jiraporn, P., Kim, Y. S., & Nemec, C. (2004). Earnings management following duality-creating successions: Ethnostatistics, impression management, and agency theory. Academy of Management Journal, 47, 267–275.

Faleye, O. (2007). Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Financial Economics, 83, 501–529.

Fama, E., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law & Economics, 26, 327–349.

Finkelstein, S., & D’Aveni, R. A. (1994). CEO duality as a double-edged sword: How boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. Academy of Management Journal, 37, 1079–1108.

Francis, J., Huang, A. H., Rajgopal, S., & Zang, A. Y. (2005). CEO reputation and reporting quality. Working paper, Duke University and University of Washington.

Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., & Boeker, W. (1994). The effects of board size and diversity on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 15, 241–250.

Goyal, V. K., & Park, C. W. (2002). Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8, 49–66.

Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Institutional investors and executive compensation. Journal of Finance, 58, 2351–2374.

Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review, 88, 96–118.

Holderness, C. G., Kroszner, R. S., & Sheehan, D. P. (1999). Were the good old days that good? Changes in managerial stock ownership since the great depression. Journal of Finance, 54, 435–469.

Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48, 831–880.

Jensen, M C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.

Lehn, K., Patro, S., & Zhao, M. (2006). Determinants of the size and structure of corporate boards: 1935–2000. Working paper, University of Pittsburgh and Bentley College.

Milbourn, T. T. (2003). CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 233–262.

Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1988). Managerial ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293–315.

Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., & Young, S. (2003). Managerial equity ownership and the demand for outside directors. European Financial Management, 9, 99–118.

Pi, L., & Timme, S. G. (1993). Corporate control and bank efficiency. Journal of Banking & Finance, 17, 515–530.

Rajgopal, S., Shevlin, T., & Zamora, V. (2006). CEOs’ outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts. Journal of Finance, 51, 1813–1844.

Rechner, P. L., & Dalton, D. R. (1991). CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 155–160.

Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. (1990). Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 26, 175–192.

Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy, 94, 461–488.

Stoeberl, P. A., & Sherony, B. C. (1985). Board efficiency and effectiveness. In E. Mattar & M. Balls (Eds.), Handbook for corporate directors (pp. 12.1–12.10). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Vancil, R. F. (1987). Passing the baton: Managing the process of CEO succession. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185–213.