Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality

Aumann, 1964, The bargaining set for cooperative games, 443

Axelrod, 1984

Ball, 1991, An evaluation of learning in the bilateral winner's curse, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 48, 1, 10.1016/0749-5978(91)90002-B

Bazerman, M.H., Samuelson, W., 1983. The winner's curse: An empirical investigation. In: Tietz, R. (Ed.), Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol. 213. Springer, Berlin.

Berninghaus, S.K., Ehrhart, K.-M., 1996. Stochastic learning in tacit coordination games. Discussion paper. Game Theory and Experimental Economics, No. 2. Institut für Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Karlsruhe.

Bolton, G., Ockenfels, A. 1997. ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. Working paper. Penn State University, University Park, PA.

Capen, 1971, Competitive bidding in high risk situations, Journal of Petrol Technology, 23, 641, 10.2118/2993-PA

Cason, T., Friedman, D., Price formation in single call markets, Econometrica, forthcoming.

Fehr, E., Schmidt, K., 1997. How to account for fair and unfair outcomes. Talk at the THEBORA Workshop, Bonn, 6–10 May 1997.

Hennig-Schmidt, H., 1996. Bargaining between Groups as Players – Textprotocols of a Video Experiment, Experimental Data Documentation Series I.96; Behavior of Groups as Players in a Bargaining Experiment – Some Results on the Negotiation Processes from a Video Experiment, Discussion Paper B-355; Equity, Fairness and Prominence – Determinants for the Behavior of Player Groups in a Bargaining Video Experiment, Discussion Paper B-356e, Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn.

Kagel, J.H., Levin, D., 1996. Common value auctions: Auctions with asymmetric information. Dept. of Economics, University Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA.

1995

Kahan, 1984

Keser, 1992, Experimental Duopoly Markets with Demand Inertia, 391

Keser, C., 1997. SUPER: Strategies used in public goods experimentation rounds. Discussion paper. University of Karlsruhe.

Kuon, 1994, Two-Person Bargaining with Incomplete Information, 412

Kuon, 1993, The negotiation agreement area, Group Decision and Negotiation, 2, 323, 10.1007/BF01384487

Maschler, M., 1978. Playing an N-person game: An experiment. In: Sauermann, H. (Ed.), Coalition Forming Behavior, Contributions to Experimental Economics, vol. 8. Mohr, Tübingen, pp. 231–328.

Mitzkewitz, 1993, Experimental results on ultimatum games with incomplete information, International Journal of Game Theory, 22, 171, 10.1007/BF01243649

Nagel, 1996, Unravelling in guessing games, American Economic Review, 85, 1313

Nagel, R., Tang, F.F., 1997. Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: An investigation of learning. Discussion paper no. 149, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Pruitt, 1970, Reward structure of cooperation, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 21, 10.1037/h0024914

Roth, 1995, Learning in extensive-form games, Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 164, 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80020-X

Ryll, 1996, Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study, 440

Selten, 1987, Equity and coalition bargaining in experimental three-person games, 42

Selten, R., Berg, C.C., 1970. Drei experimentelle Oligopolspielserien mit kontinuierlichem Zeitablauf. In: Sauermann, H. (Ed.), Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, vol. II. Mohr, Tübingen, pp. 162–221.

Selten, R., Buchta, J., 1994. Experimental sealed bid first price auctions with directly observed bid functions. Discussion paper B-270. Universität Bonn Sonderforschungsbereich 303.

Selten, R., Krischker, W., 1982. Comparison of two theories for characteristic function experiments. In: Tietz, R. (Ed.), Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol. 213. Springer, Berlin, pp. 259–264.

Selten, 1997, Duopoly strategies programmed by experienced players, Econometrica, 65, 517, 10.2307/2171752

Selten, 1986, End behavior in sequences of finite prisoner's dilemma supergames, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7, 47, 10.1016/0167-2681(86)90021-1

Simon, 1957

Tietz, R., Weber, H.J., 1972. On the nature of the bargaining process in the KRESKO-game. In: Sauermann, H. (Ed.), Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, vol. III. Mohr, Tübingen, pp. 305–334.

Tversky, 1981, The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice, Science, 211, 453, 10.1126/science.7455683

Uhlich, 1989, Descriptive Theories of Bargaining, 341