Nash Implementation of a Proportional Solution to International Pollution Control Problems

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Tập 33 - Trang 314-330 - 1997
Johan Eyckmans1
1Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, B-3000, Leuven, Belgium

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