Unilateral effects of partial acquisitions: consistent calculation of GUPPI under horizontal merger guidelines within the EU
Tóm tắt
We derive a consistent formula of the Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index (GUPPI) with Council Regulation Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2004) by: (i) expressing the amount of acquired equity stake as a function of the market share of the victim firm and (ii) assuming a logit demand function. The results show that the anti-competitive effects of partial acquisitions are higher in this case than under partial acquisitions with constant equity stakes and that competition authorities should be skeptical when they use traditional screening indicators in order to estimate the unilateral effects of partial acquisitions in Bertrand markets with differentiated products.
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