Why People Punish Defectors

Journal of Theoretical Biology - Tập 208 - Trang 79-89 - 2001
JOSEPH HENRICH1, ROBERT BOYD2
1University of Michigan, 701 Tappan Road, D3276, Ann Arbor, MI, 48109-1234, U.S.A.
2Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles, 405 Hilgard Ave, Los Angeles, CA, 90024, U.S.A.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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