Games with espionage

Allen, 1986, The demand for (differential) information, Rev. Econ. Stud., 53, 311, 10.2307/2297631 Aumann, 1974, Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies, J. Math. Econ., 1, 67, 10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8 Blackwell, 1950, Equivalent comparisons of experiments, Ann. Math. Stat., 21, 265 Crawford, 1982, Strategic information transmission, Econometrica, 50, 1431, 10.2307/1913390 Forges, 1986, An approach to communication equilibria, Econometrica, 54, 1375, 10.2307/1914304 Fudenberg, 1989, Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player, Econometrica, 57, 759, 10.2307/1913771 Fudenberg, 1992, Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed, Rev. Econ. Stud., 59, 561, 10.2307/2297864 Glicksberg, 1952, A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed point theorem, with application to Nash equilibrium points, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc., 3, 170 Green, J.R., Stokey, N.L., 1981. The value of information in the delegation problem. HIER discussion paper No. 776. Harvard University Hirshleifer, 1971, The private and social value of information and the reward to inventive activity, Amer. Econ. Rev., 61, 561 Kamien, 1990, On the value of information in a strategic conflict, Games Econ. Behav., 2, 129, 10.1016/0899-8256(90)90026-Q Kreps, 1982, Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, J. Econ. Theory, 27, 245, 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 Mailath, 1993, Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions, J. Econ. Theory, 59, 169, 10.1006/jeth.1993.1010 Matsui, 1989, Information leakage forces cooperation, Games Econ. Behav., 1, 94, 10.1016/0899-8256(89)90007-9 Monderer, 1996, Potential games, Games Econ. Behav., 14, 124, 10.1006/game.1996.0044 Moulin, 1978, Strategically zero-sum games: The class whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon, Int. J. Game Theory, 7, 201, 10.1007/BF01769190 Myerson, 1991 Perea y Monsuwe, A., Swinkels, J., 1997. Selling information in extensive form games. Preprint Sadanand, 1996, Firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry: A choice between commitment and flexibility, J. Econ. Theory, 70, 516, 10.1006/jeth.1996.0102 Sorin, S., 1998. Distribution equilibrium I: Definitions and examples. THEMA discussion paper #9835. University Paris 10—Nanterre Van Damme, 1996, Commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing, Games Econ. Behav., 15, 290, 10.1006/game.1996.0069 Van Damme, 1997, Games with imperfectly observable commitment, Games Econ. Behav., 21, 282, 10.1006/game.1997.0524