Climate Engineering in an Interconnected World: The Role of Tariffs

Dynamic Games and Applications - Tập 8 - Trang 573-587 - 2018
Markus Eigruber1, Franz Wirl1
1Faculty of Business, Economics, and Statistics, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

Tóm tắt

This paper investigates strategic trade policies as a response to negative externalities linked to climate engineering. Parties negatively affected, or which only perceive damages, may react to geoengineering by deploying trade sanctions, i.e. the imposition of tariffs. By introducing a dynamic trade model, we show that geoengineering-averse countries have an incentive to implement or increase existing tariffs when the other country uses geoengineering. Our contribution is to highlight that potential consequences on trade should be taken into account before climate engineering techniques are applied. This is particularly crucial in our globalized world since a successful climate policy demands large scale if not global cooperation.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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