Climate Engineering in an Interconnected World: The Role of Tariffs
Tóm tắt
This paper investigates strategic trade policies as a response to negative externalities linked to climate engineering. Parties negatively affected, or which only perceive damages, may react to geoengineering by deploying trade sanctions, i.e. the imposition of tariffs. By introducing a dynamic trade model, we show that geoengineering-averse countries have an incentive to implement or increase existing tariffs when the other country uses geoengineering. Our contribution is to highlight that potential consequences on trade should be taken into account before climate engineering techniques are applied. This is particularly crucial in our globalized world since a successful climate policy demands large scale if not global cooperation.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Bala G, Duffy PB, Taylor KE (2008) Impact of geoengineering schemes on the global hydrological cycle. Proc Natl Acad Sci 105(22):7664–7669
Barrett S (2008) The incredible economics of geoengineering. Environ Resour Econ 39(1):45–54
Barrett S, Dannenberg A (2016) An experimental investigation into ‘pledge and review’ in climate negotiations. Clim Change 138(1):339–351
Baumol WJ, Panzar JC, Willig RD (1982) Contestable markets and the theory of industry structure. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego
Bertoldi P (2011) Assessment and experience of white certificate schemes in the European union. European Commission, Directorate General JRC, New York
Buchanan JM (1969) External diseconomies, corrective taxes, and market structure. Am Econ Rev 59(1):174–177
Clark G (2008) A farewell to alms: a brief economic history of the world. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Corner A, Pidgeon N, Parkhill K (2012) Perceptions of geoengineering: public attitudes, stakeholder perspectives, and the challenge of ‘upstream’ engagement. Wiley Interdiscip Rev Clim Change 3(5):451–466
Dockner EJ, Long N (1993) International pollution control: cooperative versus noncooperative strategies. J Environ Econ Manag 25(1):13–29
Dockner EJ, Jorgensen S, Long N, Sorger G (2000) Differential games in economics and management science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Heyen D, Wiertz T, Irvine PJ (2015) Regional disparities in SRM impacts: the challenge of diverging preferences. Clim Change 133(4):557–563
Heyen D, Horton J, Moreno-Cruz JB (2017) Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering: escalation, cooperation, or nonuse? Working paper
Lenton TM, Held H, Kriegler E, Hall JW, Lucht W, Rahmstorf S, Schellnhuber HJ (2008) Tipping elements in the Earth’s climate system. Proc Natl Acad Sci 105(6):1786–1793
Manoussi V, Xepapadeas A (2017) Cooperation and competition in climate change policies: mitigation and climate engineering when countries are asymmetric. Environ Resour Econ 66(4):605–627
Millard-Ball A (2012) The tuvalu syndrome. Clim Change 110(3):1047–1066
Moreno-Cruz JB, Keith DW (2013) Climate policy under uncertainty: a case for solar geoengineering. Clim Change 121(3):431–444
Nordhaus W (1991) To slow or not to slow: the economics of the greenhouse effect. Econ J 101:920–937
Nordhaus W (2007) A review of the stern review on the economics of climate change. J Econ Lit 45(3):686–702
Nordhaus W (2015) Climate clubs: overcoming free-riding in international climate policy. Am Econ Rev 105(4):1339–1370
Robock A (2008) 20 Reasons why geoengineering may be a bad idea. Bull At Sci 64(2):14–18
Ruff L (1988) Least-cost-planning and demand-side-management: six common fallacies and one simple truth. Public Util Fortn 121:19–26
Schelling TC (1996) The economic diplomacy of geoengineering. Clim Change 33(3):303–307
Schmidt H, Alterskjær K, Bou Karam D, Boucher O, Jones A, Kristjánsson JE, Niemeier U, Schulz M, Aaheim A, Benduhn F, Lawrence M, Timmreck C (2012) Solar irradiance reduction to counteract radiative forcing from a quadrupling of \(\text{ CO }_{2}\): climate responses simulated by four earth system models. Earth Syst Dyn 3(1):63–78
The Royal Society (2009) Geoengineering the climate: science, governance and uncertainty. The Royal Society, London
Tsutsui S, Mino K (1990) Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices. J Econ Theory 52(1):136–161
Urpelainen J (2012) Geoengineering and global warming: a strategic perspective. Int Environ Agreem Polit Law Econ 12(4):375–389
Victor DG (2008) On the regulation of geoengineering. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 24(2):322–336
Weitzman ML (2015) A voting architecture for the governance of free-driver externalities, with application to geoengineering. Scand J Econ 117(4):1049–1068
Wirl F (2014) Taxes versus permits as incentive for the intertemporal supply of a clean technology by a monopoly. Resour Energy Econ 36(1):248–269